The European sensibilities of Stephan Fruehling and Ben Schreer infuse a little old-world continental grace and charm into our debate and provide an antidote to its Asia-centricity. Nonetheless, I'm not sure they intend a compliment when they compare my Quarterly Essay to French writing on American power. I think they suspect me of whimsical Gallic anti-Americanism.
Not guilty. As I make clear in the essay, I would like nothing better than for America to remain the uncontested dominant power in Asia, but I fear this is not possible as China grows. They say my fears are exaggerated, because American power depends not just on its economic weight but on its capacity to build coalitions around shared interests and values. I think they miss two points.
First, soft power and the business of building coalitions: I agree with Ben and Stephan that America's power vis a vis China depends among other things on its capacity to attract support from others. But they seem to think that this capacity is inherent in America's nature as a country. I would say it depends rather on the existence of an actual and sustainable congruence of interests between the US and prospective supporters. For reasons I make clear in the essay, this is not to be taken for granted. If the countries of Asia believe that the region's peace can be maintained in an order based on shared power, they are unlikely to support America in asserting primacy at the cost of disorder.
Second, the nature of American primacy: Ben and Stephan think Australia should be relaxed because America, supported by its allies, will remain strong enough to resist China's challenge to its primacy.
But their vision of Asia's future is very different from the Asia of the past four decades, when US power has been uncontested. They see Asia moving to a balance of power system in which Asia is dominated by systemic competition between power blocs. Sometimes in history – eighteenth century Europe, for example – such systems have been relatively stable and peaceful. At other times – twentieth century Europe – they have been disastrous. Ben and Stephan seem confident that Asia in the 21st century would look more like the former. I am much less sanguine.
They also disagree that what I call the European order of the 19th century provides the best model for a peaceful Asian future. They object to my calling this system a Concert of Power, because they think that term should apply only to the first half of the period.
Well I'm not so sure, but let's not argue over labels or even over models. The core question is whether we believe that a future Asian order based on shared leadership could work, and last. If it can, I think it would serve us better than any of the alternatives. I do not share their faith that Asia's great powers, some armed with nuclear weapons, will limit themselves to Cabinet wars as the European great powers of the 18th century did.
Finally, just to be clear, I'm not sure why Ben and Stephan think I reject armed neutrality as a serious option for Australia. I simply point out that it would be very hard, and would get harder as the economic relativities shift further, and that other options might work better. Even so, it is an option we need to consider if we find ourselves living in a more contested Asia.
Photo by Flickr user marfis75, used under a Creative Commons license.
