Iraq is one step closer to regaining its sovereignty and seeing the complete withdrawal of Coalition troops. This week, the Iraqi cabinet overwhelmingly approved a Status of Armed Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US, ending nervous speculation that Iraqi lawmakers would let the 31 December deadline pass in favour of a renegotiating with a new US president. As usual in Iraqi politics, a resolution was reached in the nick of time and after tortured to and fro over the conditions. 

The approved draft calls for a 3-year timetable for withdrawal — meaning all troops must be out by 2011. This is a serious US concession. The Bush Administration repeatedly rejected strict timetables and insisted on complete command of its operations, control over Iraq’s borders, extrajudicial jurisdiction over its troops and detention of Iraqi citizens. In the final agreement, the US gets none of those things, leading many analysts to speculate that the 'client state' relationship between Iraq and the US is over.

The SOFA must pass through one final hurdle before its final passage. It must be approved by a  majority in the Iraqi parliament. Though Iraqi lawmakers who support the agreement are confident they have the numbers, there is reluctance to present it to parliament without a national consensus on the agreement. 

Sadrist lawmakers object to the pact in principle; they want US troops out of Iraq sooner rather than three years from now. And ironically, Sunni parties, the Coalition's erstwhile foes, are reluctant to see Coalition troops draw down for fear that Iraq succumbs to Iranian influence. Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's pre-eminent Shia cleric, has offered his tacit approval for the document, but he too states that all elements of Iraqi society must approve of the security agreement for it to succeed.  More...

After the revelation last week about Iran's diplomatic intervention in the Pacific, I was interested to find out a little more Middle Eastern financial links to the South Pacific and environs. East Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao’s recent visit to Kuwait, for example, has highlighted a very low-key but sporadically active approach by Gulf nations to aid and investment  in our region. Prior to Gusmao’s visit, Ramos Horta made two visits to the country, ostensibly to seek development funds.

Through Kuwait’s overseas aid vehicle, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, other regional countries have sought development funds at concessional rates. Not that we are talking big sums. Since the early 1980s, for example, the Solomon Islands has received a little over $11 million. Western Samoa was another even smaller aid recipient over 20 years ago.

The PNG Government has sought investment from the Gulf, with an Abu Dhabi investment body to fund a stake in a Liquid Natural Gas project. However, it’s unlikely that PNG will become a tourist destination for Gulf Arabs any time soon, after Saudi Prince Walid bin Talal’s 15-minute tour of Port Moresby last year.

Tehran and Honiara have little in common, but as Taiwan found out a long time ago, the Solomon Islands’ vote in the UN General Assembly is worth as much as that of the US. Hence the interest Iran has started to show in the welfare of Solomon Islanders. The two countries recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which may eventually lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The Solomons Foreign Minister William Haomae recently returned from an official visit to Iran, where he led a delegation to discuss areas of future cooperation with the Islamic Republic. And even more recently, the Ministry of Health has left open the possibility of Iran funding the travel of Solomons students to Cuba for medical training (if only North Korea could get involved we'd have a trifecta of evil in the South Pacific).

So what does this all mean for the region? Iran’s revolutionary form of Islamic government is hardly going to find any adherents in Malaita or Guadalcanal, while the Solomons Government is grateful for aid money that is likely to come with only one string attached – a pro-Iran vote in the UN if and when required. Of more immediate interest is whether Iran’s largesse extends to any more of our Pacific neighbours, if the Solomons-Iran link proves fruitful for both parties.

Guest blogger: David Knoll researches US foreign policy in Washington, DC, and served as research assistant for former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s last book, ‘Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West.’

During the US presidential campaign Barack Obama pledged to shift the foreign policy focus in Washington away from Iraq and toward the good fight in Afghanistan. Dealing with the safe haven that militants enjoy across the border in Pakistan is the key to achieving any sort of realistic stability in Afghanistan, yet even a fairly detailed search of Obama’s website does not reveal his Pakistan policy. A run through of his thoughts on Pakistan is therefore helpful.

The Bush Administration has a quiet understanding with the Pakistani Government to carry out US airstrikes on high value targets in Pakistani territory. The US has conducted 18 such strikes in Pakistan since August. An Obama Administration would probably continue the airstrike-only policy for the immediate future. Ground incursions by US troops seem to be off the table for now.

So how will the Obama Administration’s Pakistan policy differ? More...

In an interview with the 7.30 Report last night, Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested the US is considering an even bigger Afghanistan troop surge than President-Elect Obama has called for up to now:

We don't have enough troops, it won't be solved by turning to our allies, we can't create Afghan forces that quickly. They've raised the requirement to some 20 to 25,000 reinforcements, they've talked about three brigades not one, some have gone as far as five.

My understanding is that Obama wants up to 15,000 more troops, so this would be a substantial additional effort.

By the way, I had all sorts of curly Afghanistan questions planned for Defence Minister Fitzgibbon, but his office just called me to cancel our interview. Not happy, Joel.

While domestic issues will take much of his attention, Barack Obama has, many Middle Eastern challenges requiring his attention. Obama has an experienced team of formal and informal advisers that is sure to grow in the near future. Most of the issues facing him are well known, and at first glance his incoming administration’s regional intent is without unrealistic promises, as this 18 month-old speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee attests.

The need for a negotiated Palestinian solution, withdrawal from Iraq and unacceptability of a nuclear Iran have remained constants for Obama throughout his campaign. Iraq and the Iranian nuclear issue are of the most immediate concern, but the longer-term issues are no less important. Support for continued Syrian-Israeli peace talks is one area that may yield results in the longer term.  More...

The headline of Peter Hartcher's story in today's Sydney Morning Herald — Obama to ask for troops in 'war we need to win' — promises more than it delivers. First of all, the main quotes in the story come from a Brookings Institution scholar who advised the Obama campaign, and not the Obama camp itself. And second, Jeffrey Bader never mentions troops, only saying that 'We would be looking to have different allies to make a contribution'. That's barely even grammatical and could refer to any number of countries.

Still, the broad proposition that the Obama Administration will ask more of its allies is one that I have heard from other good sources. One to watch.

UPDATE: It seems my boss agrees.

Guest blogger: Jim Terrie is a risk management consultant and former Africa analyst with the International Crisis Group.

The recent fighting and looming humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has thrust it back into the news and brought a flurry of diplomatic activity. It has also highlighted how few options exist in the face of an intractable conflict.

The crisis in the Congo started in the period after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which saw hundreds of thousand of Rwandan Hutus flee over the border of then Zaire. The consequences led to the fall of the Mobutu regime and a conflict involving numerous African countries, Congolese armies and militias. The cost is estimated to have been over 5 million lives. The UN peacekeeping mission, the UN’s largest, has been in place since 2000, and costs nearly $1 billion a year. More...

Politics makes for strange bedfellows at the best of times, but in the Lebanese political system the manoeuvrings of Hizbullah in pursuit of its political aims make for weird viewing. Beginning in early 2006 they broadened their sectarian political base through the memorandum of understanding they signed with Michel Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement. 

That was strange enough, but next year’s parliamentary election has brought with it a greater Hizbullah urgency to create alliances that will strengthen its position in the non-Shi‘a community. Its abrupt and ruthless May takeover of West Beirut and subsequent Doha Accord dealt a blow to Saad Hariri’s Sunni Future Movement, and made the Shi‘a party attractive as a political ally. It is for this reason that a previously staunch anti-Hizbullah figure such as the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has softened his stance towards the group.

But not all of Hizbullah’s efforts towards agreements with other Lebanese groups has been as successful. In August this year Hizbullah signed an MoU a collection of Salafist groups. The fluid nature of such groups and lack of internal discipline and agreement was on display when the same Salafist groups ‘froze’ the agreement the very next day. Even in Lebanon it appears that there are some limits to sectarian compatibility.

Middle Eastern diplomatic appointments do not normally elicit a great deal of interest, but some developments on this front are worthy of closer scrutiny. The UAE recently appointed its first two female ambassadors (to Sweden and Spain), an act that followed closely on the heels of Bahrain’s appointment of a female ambassador to Washington.

Of more significance, though, has been the flurry of Arab ambassadorial appointments to Iraq, further reinforcing perceptions that the security situation is improving. Arab states had been wary of appointing ambassadors, given that the Jordanian embassy was targeted by a car bomb that killed 14 in 2003, the Egyptian envoy was kidnapped and killed in 2005 and the Bahraini charge shot and wounded a few days later, while an Emirati diplomat was kidnapped in 2006. More...

In case you missed it, the Scotsman brings us a story from Iran that has the clear potential to escalate, perhaps feeding into Tehran's nuclear negotiations. Iran, it seems, has made a pitch for a Guinness Book of Records entry for the world's biggest ostrich sandwich. Of course, there was a hitch in Iran's quest for global supremacy: just before the tape measures were drawn out to measure the 1.5 km sandwich, a voracious group of Tehranis raced in and devoured the giant snack.

The big question remains: will the video footage of the sandwich-feast be enough to secure Iran's claim to the world's biggest ostrich sandwich or will the diabolical, imperialistic forces of Western hegemony conspire to rob Iran once again of its rightful place on the world stage?  

Former ABC Middle East correspondent David Hardaker gave the Wednesday Lowy Lunch yesterday. You can hear his full address here, or you can listen to the short interview I conducted with him afterward, which focused on his two main themes: satellite television, and online citizen journalism and activism.

Politics is a difficult game. The players must reconcile their good intentions with  soaring egos, political imperatives and, in the case of those leaving office,the desire to leave a favourable legacy. It is sometimes comforting to know that, in Australia, our politicians occupy themselves with largely economic and basic societal issues such as paid maternity leave, industrial relations and the like. In the Middle East, the issues are often of a different order, but the same basic motivating factors are apparent.

Take the issue of Middle East peace. A recent newspaper interview with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, traditionally a political hawk, has created headlines, with Olmert positioning himself as a relative ‘dove’ on the issue of peace with the Palestinians. Naturally, such an epiphany by someone in Olmert’s position raises a few questions about timing and motives (The Weekend Australian had a rather kinder treatment of Olmert’s interview than did Israel’s Haaretz). Whatever the truth to the Israeli Prime Minister’s political ‘deathbed’ conversion, the nature of politics suggests that issues of legacy must have been at least as strong a motivating factor as conviction.

What lessons can be learnt from the the security and reconstruction missions in Iraq or Afghanistan that might be applied to other conflicts? Lydia Khalil — now a non resident fellow here at Lowy and formerly a policy advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad — offered a number of suggestions during her Lowy Lunch this week. You can get a taste of her talk below and then chew over the detail in full via the podcast.

A couple of weeks ago Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, perhaps the world's most influential living Islamic scholar, accused Shi’a Muslims of being a threat to Sunni Muslim societes. The subsequent controversy is still being played out in the Arab media, where Qaradawi’s comments have been debated and condemned, including by some of his long-time friends and supporters.

Qaradawi has fuelled yet another round of ‘Are the Shi’a coming to get us?’ talk in the Sunni Muslim world. Personally, I think the final lines of this Guardian report on the subject, quoting al-Arabiyya commentator Abdul Rahman al-Rashed, sum it up rather nicely: ‘In reality, there is no Shi’a-Sunni problem; there are only differences between governments’. 

But if you want a really interesting and nuanced analysis of Shi’a-Sunni relations in the Gulf, see Non-resident Fellow Rodger Shanahan’s recent Lowy Institute Analysis, Bad Moon Not Rising: The Myth of the Shi’a crescent in the Gulf.

A worst case scenario often invoked in the event of an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities is the Islamic Republic’s closure of the economically vital Straits of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil passes. Regardless of whether Iran is capable of carrying out such an action, the possibility would be enough to put upward pressure on oil prices.

The Gulf states are particularly mindful of the vulnerability of the Straits of Hormuz, but have had few alternatives to date. Although the majority of Saudi exports go through Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf it also has the capability to export through the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The UAE has also created alternatives: Abu Dhabi has started work on a 370km pipeline from its onshore fields to the oil export terminal in the neighbouring emirate of  Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

 Now comes news that the UAE may be considering an even more ambitious project – a 180km canal from Dubai to Fujairah capable of taking oil tankers. In a country which is a byword for impressive and expensive architectural projects, it will be interesting to see whether fear of an Iranian economic blockade of the straits of Hormuz is enough to get this project off the ground and through the Hajar mountains.

We've now resolved our technical problems, so we can belatedly resume this series. Below is an interview I recorded last Wednesday with our guest speaker, Major General (retd.) Jim Molan, author of Running the War in Iraq (more or less an accurate description of his role in the war).

You can hear Jim's entire Wednesday Lowy Lunch address here, or listen to a short interview below, covering the highlights of his speech. Among other things, Jim talks about the 'revolution' going on in Iraq, and the thirty years of neglect of our defence force.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to allow civilian nuclear trade with India is a chance to test some of the judgments I offered last week about rocky relations among major powers. I anticipated bad times ahead for US-India and China-India relations.

On the first count, things turned out differently. The US got its way, on India’s behalf, in persuading the NSG – including non-proliferation purists such as New Zealand, Ireland and Austria – to accept the deal, although it took this major eleventh-hour statement on India’s non-proliferation and disarmament intent and principles to help sway them. New Delhi now has every reason to be grateful to Washington, and US-India relations are likely to strengthen further – unless of course the US Congress still delays or withholds its approval of the deal. (And there is some other fallout: India is unhappy about a State Department document on the nuclear deal, published on the eve of the NSG meeting. The document may have helped persuade doubters in the NSG, but it is at odds with some domestic Indian rhetoric about the deal, especially on whether or not it prevents future Indian nuclear testing).

On China-India relations, events hewed closer to my script. China played its hand against India, voicing last-minute concerns about the non-proliferation consequences of giving India special nuclear status. So there will be mutterings in the corridors of New Delhi’s South Block today about Chinese perfidy – after all, India’s Prime Minister believed he had brought back certain understandings on this issue from his visit to Beijing in January. India reportedly even summoned the Chinese ambassador at 3am on Saturday for a dressing-down on China’s about-face.

What I failed to envisage was that China would behave clumsily. Beijing reportedly upset India by turning against New Delhi at the last minute, yet China still failed to secure the outcome it wanted. Chinese diplomats probably assumed the small nations weren’t going to budge. When they did, China looked isolated and dissenting – which is not the international image it wants and needs.  In the end, China did not block the NSG consensus. But the Indians won’t forget.

Yet diplomatic life goes on: China’s Foreign Minister is in India today, and can look forward to an evening of subcontinental cuisine and culture as the guest of his Indian counterpart. The conversation, too, is likely to be spicy and colourful.

Photo by Flickr user ferg2k, used under a Creative Commons license.

The decision by the international Nuclear Suppliers Group on Saturday to end its 34-year-old nuclear trade embargo is momentous in several ways.

It is a turning point in the recognition of India’s emergence as a major strategic and economic player by the rest of the world, and especially by the other great powers: the US, France, UK and Russia found common cause in bringing India into the club of legitimate nuclear trade, and the rest of the NSG’s 45-nation membership following, however reluctantly.

Its implications for nuclear non-proliferation are mixed, and will be hotly debated. More...

For those who thought the feminist movement had largely achieved its aims in the West, the sisters still fighting the good fight in the Near East face different challenges, achieving varying degrees of success. In Kuwait, for instance, women were granted the right to vote in 2005, while those in Saudi Arabia still aren't allowed to drive.

Recently, new challenges have arisen. In Yemen, the Ministry of Justice has tried to introduce marriage contracts that require only the signatures of the groom and the bride’s guardian, leaving out the requirement for the bride’s signature. Yemeni women’s groups are trying to have the law amended before parliament debates it next month.

In Iran, meanwhile, women’s rights activists have had more success in having a 'Family Support Bill’ taken out of parliament and referred back to the legal committee for review. Among other things, the bill would have allowed men to take a second wife without the agreement of the first (polygamy is legal in Iran, but it is not widely practiced).

So many issues, so much cultural tradition, so many interpreted religious opinions. Women’s rights groups certainly have their challenges ahead of them.

Reading Patrick Walters’ piece from Baghdad in today’s Australian got me thinking n about how ‘conventional wisdom’ is often neither ‘conventional’ nor ‘wise’.  Walters reports, accurately, that the security situation in Baghdad has improved remarkably. This is not news to those who have been dealing with Iraq intimately. But for those whose information source has been the ‘conventional wisdom’ about the war in Iraq it may appear astounding. 

As I prepared for my deployment to Iraq last November, many of my friends, colleagues, acquaintances and the inevitable taxi driver expressed degrees of concern for my involvement in what they regarded as a hopeless situation. I encountered similar sentiments on my return home in June. The situation I encountered during my time in Iraq (which coincided with the second half of the ‘surge’) in no way resembled the hopelessness conventionally depicted back home.

While the situation was not ideal (clearly, 135,000 foreign troops assisting in a sovereign nation is indicative of problem), things were obviously better than had been depicted. I spoke with many Iraqis (troops and civilians) and Coalition members across the breadth of Iraq, and the message they had was consistent – things were improving. More...

While the conspicuous oil wealth of the Gulf states should no longer amaze us, it is sometimes worth examining how Gulf rentier states devise budgets for annual income based on such a fluctuating resource. In the case of Kuwait (which sits on an estimated 10% of the world’s oil reserves), the Ministry of Finance staff took a pretty conservative approach with its estimate of US$50 a barrel for FY 2008. Little wonder then that its $25 billion income for the first three months of this financial year represents more than 50% of the budgeted annual income. The Ministry was also a bit off with its FY 2007 estimates, with its actual $72.2 billion income a whopping 127% higher than forecasts.

 The regional outlook is similarly bullish, with estimates that the six GCC countries will reap some $562 billion in oil income this financial year. Little wonder then that Gulf sovereign wealth funds are an issue that causes some concern among Western countries, where fears are that governments may seek to invest their enormous surpluses for strategic rather than commercial interests. As this article points out, though, not all countries use sovereign investment funds in the same manner, and failure to appreciate this risks losing foreign direct investment for no good reason.

While there has been little reporting on the security situation in Lebanon since the signing of the Doha Accord, recent events highlight the continued tensions that run below the surface and the complexity of the security challenges facing the Lebanese Government.

In the north, ongoing clashed between Sunnis and Alawites claimed the life of a local imam, while in the south, Hizbullah gunmen shot at a Lebanese army helicopter, killing the pilot. The group later handed over a suspect to the Lebanese military, claiming that the incident had been a tragic mistake.

In the Lebanese camps there are continuing clashes between Fatah and militant Islamist group Jund ash Sham, while in Beirut all is calm except for the odd clash between rival political groups which involved nothing bigger than guns and three grenades. In Beirut terms, this amounts to a scuffle.

Apart from that, all has been quiet. And at least a new Army chief has been appointed after a three-month wait following the accession to the presidency of his predecessor. Given what is going on in Lebanon, he will have his hands full.

Carl Ungerer writes (my response follows):

Watching Sam and Hugh debate the merits of nuclear disarmament in the Middle East reminds me of a conversation I had with senior Israeli defence officials in the summer of 2006, when the war with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon was in full swing. In the face of Hezbollah’s growing rocket arsenal (supplied by Tehran) and the command and control systems (run by Damascus), Israeli commanders openly canvassed the possibility that Israel would one day need to declare its nuclear capability – in what one general called ‘the Jericho option’. More...

Sam wonders why I am so pessimistic about Iran forgoing its nuclear weapons, when Libya did. Is Iran really so different, he asks? Yes, it is. It is much easier to invade. With a small population, highly-concentrated along the coast, Bush really could have succeeded in Libya what he has tried in Iraq, and in 2002 it seemed quite credible he would try. I think Gadaffi pre-emptively disarmed because he understood that risk, and not because he had been converted to the virtues of non-proliferation. Don’t hold your breath for Iran to follow his example.     

Certainly the chances that Israel will adopt unilateral nuclear disarmament are slim, but not for the reasons Hugh White mentions.

I agree that such an Israeli gesture could only come in the context of an Iranian decision to back away from its nuclear program, and this in turn is likely only if there is rapprochment with Washington. By why does that have to mean that Washington would need to extend its nuclear umbrella to cover Tehran, as Hugh suggests? I doubt it will require anything so radical, or even that a US-Iran 'grand bargain' is necessary. Libya, after all, settled for much less. Is Iran really so different?

The main reason I am pessimistic that Israel will try this gambit is domestic. I'm no expert on the Israeli political and bureaucratic system, but I imagine there would be tremendous institutional resistance to an idea like this. The nuclear deterrent also enjoys widespread popular support in Israel.

As always, what's needed to turn an unlikely idea like this one into reality is visionary leadership. Israel needs a Reagan.

Before coming down on Raoul’s side of their debate, let me offer some support for Sam’s proposal that Israel should pre-emptively disarm. Look at it this way. Israel now finds itself confronting the logic of non-proliferation that many others have faced. Back in the 1960s and 70s many countries, including Australia, weighed the benefits of building nuclear forces against the costs of driving their neighbours to do the same, and opted to abstain. Israel took the opposite view. It can hardly be surprised that one of its neighbours has finally chosen to respond in kind.

Indeed, the surprise is that it has taken so long. More...

Raoul makes some strong points, but let me explain why I think they are not knock-out blows to my argument.

First, I agree that Iran's nuclear program is probably not solely motivated by a desire to match Israel. Tehran perhaps feels a nuclear force of its own could deter a US invasion, and it may also want nuclear weapons for prestige reasons and to dominate the region. For all those reasons, unilateral Israeli disarmament might turn out to be a useless gesture, with Iran still plowing on with its enrichment program. But as I've already argued, that's a manageable risk for Israel, as it could maintain a 'virtual deterrent' through its civilianised nuclear program. In an emergency, Israel could then rebuild its nuclear arsenal at short notice. More...

Guest blogger: Raoul Heinrichs is the 2007 Lowy Institute Thawley Scholar

Like Chris Skinner, I’m deeply skeptical about Sam’s proposition that Israel could improve its own security by resorting to unilateral nuclear disarmament, as a means of resolving the crisis over Iran’s nuclear aspirations.

The logic of Sam’s argument appears to rest on the dubious assumption that Iran’s bid for nuclear weapons – or at least the ability to quickly acquire them – is motivated almost entirely by a desire either to deter an Israeli nuclear attack or prevent itself from falling victim to Israeli coercion. Should it no longer have to confront these threats, the argument goes, Iran would have no requirement for nuclear weapons and, consequently, neither would its Arab neighbours. More...

With so much attention on the Caucasus and Pakistan, we should not ignore the disturbing news from another quarter: Kashmir.

It’s always easy for the media to portray the streets of Srinagar as a war-zone: fortified checkpoints, troops in the streets, stone-throwing protesters, shadowy militants, heavy-handed police and the like. For much of the past six years, such depictions would have been simplistic and wrong: yes, there remained violence and dissent, but an increasing proportion of the population simply wanted to get on with their lives, regardless of the sovereignty question. The boom was in tourism, not terrorism.

Now, however, the images of trouble reflect the reality. More...

Chris Skinner reponds to my post on why Israel should get rid of its nukes. My response follows:  

Ever the idealist and trusting believer in the power of logic instead of the logic of power. Hitler had a peace treaty with Stalin – wasn’t worth much in the end. Israel’s treaties with its neighbours are no more worthy if it suits any of them to invade. On the other hand, as several campaigns have proven, Israel would not be easily ‘overwhelmed in a matter of days’ by any conventional force (vide 6-day and Yom Kippur wars) as you have asserted (without evidence again, I note).

Finally — another breathtaking exemplar of naiveté in even discussing Israel voluntarily and unilaterally eschewing its nuclear deterrent – the only thing that might actually convince Iran not to attack Israel. Wishing for a less dangerous world is one thing – foolishly suggesting it can be attained by wishful thinking is quite another.

Really, there's no peacenik naivete here. The primary reason I recommend unilateral Israeli nuclear disarmament is that it would improve Israel's security. But I understand the enmities in the region and that disarmament can only work if it advantages everyone and doesn't rely on trust or faith. More...

I'm pleased to see that The Age's Diplomatic Editor, Dan Flitton, has gone into print recommending Israel abandon its nuclear deterrent. Dan says an Israeli offer of disarmament 'could forge a deal to rid the region of nuclear ambitions', though he notes that 'Israel would not trust other countries in the region to stick to any bargain for a nuclear-free Middle East.'

But here's the thing — it doesn't have to. More...

I find it easier to sympathize with Alex Duchen’s explanation of why Israel might take military action to destroy Iran’s nuclear program than with Antony Lowenstein’s arguments for why they would be wrong to do so. Frankly, if I thought there was a low-cost, low-risk air strike option offering high probabilities of inflicting strategically significant damage to the Iranian program, I would support it, just as I always thought the Osirak raid of 1982 was a good idea.

But I do not think there is such an option. In fact, leaving aside the fantasy of invasion, I think there are probably no military options to disrupt the Iranian program significantly, because I doubt the US or Israel know enough about where its key elements are hidden. 

I think Alex accepts this, but suggests that even an unsuccessful raid might be worth doing. I can’t follow her there. Her argument, and Martin Indyk’s, whom she quotes, is that Israel simply must do something because in some profound way an Iranian nuclear weapon capability would be fundamentally intolerable.  I’m not sure about that. Clearly a world without Iranian nuclear weapons would be a safer place than one with them, but how serious is the threat? I would like to sound a note of caution about the claim often made that Israel simply cannot live with an Iranian nuclear capability on the grounds that it is an ‘existential threat’. More...

Antony Lowenstein responds to Alex Duchen's post of last week about possible Israeli action against Iran's nuclear program (my response follows):

It's astounding that the Western media continually falls for this idea that the Jewish state's very existence is threatened. It's not. Ervand Abrhahamian* said the following in September 2007: More...

I quite like a joke at the Iranian regime's expense and this beauty — courtesy of a fellow traveller — was hard to pass over.

After Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took the 'highly unusual step' of invoking dear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's name, in order to get Ali Kordan confirmed as Iran's Interior Minister, it now turns out his exemplary qualification — a law degree from Oxford University — was a fake. Oxford University was asked to authenticate the 'certificate' Kordan produced, although this hardly seemed to have been necessary: the document contained some highly unlikely spelling errors including the word 'intitle'.

The guardians of Saudi Arabia’s conservative moral code are employees of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, but are better known as the mutawwa. Most expatriates come across the mutawwa as they prevent the entry of unaccompanied youth into shopping malls or call on ‘uncovered’ women to don a headscarf. To Westerners, their role does not appear much fun, and their stern countenance is rather amusingly nerdy. Such unthinking adherence to cultural mores, however, can lead to tragedy in the hands of fanatics, as it did when a fire broke out in a girls school dormitory in 2002.

Recently, the mutawwa have again been making headlines for somewhat less serious reasons. First, their own moral superiority has come into question with the accusation that one member of the organization was over budget in the wife department, when he was caught with six, rather than four. Then in Riyadh, the local mutawwa have followed the lead of their compatriots in Jeddah and Mecca by banning the sale of cats and dogs because men allegedly use pets to flirt with women. While people in Australia will find it hard to relate to the first of these stories, I’m sure that anyone who has spent an evening or weekend in Sydney’s Centennial Park or Hawthorne canal in Leichhardt may actually agree with the logic of the Riyadh mutawwa regarding the second.

Alison Broinowski responds to Jason Campbell's guest post about Australia's role in Afghanistan. My thoughts follow:

If we are really to have a view from Australia on the war in Afghanistan, let us consider whether it should be identical with that of the US. Bush sent the troops in after 9/11 to exact revenge for the attack on America and to find and destroy al Qaeda. Australia and others went along with that, NATO took over nominal command, and the UN Security Council approved it after the fact. That mission has effectively ended.

Subsequently however, as in Iraq, the motivations and justifications for the occupation changed, and our military presence has increased. What the US and its allies are now involved in is variously justified as supporting regime change, ‘stabilising’ and ‘saving’ Afghanistan, rooting out terrorists, and overcoming the Taliban, none of which Australia signed up for at the outset. While there is no doubt that the people of Afghanistan need economic development, war does not deliver it. There remains no legal justification or moral imperative for Australian troops to be fighting in their country. The same arguments for withdrawing from Iraq apply to Afghanistan too. Are the Taliban more obnoxious than the regimes in Burma or Zimbabwe? Why don’t we invade them? Moreover, we don’t have to like the Taliban to realize that Afghanistan has always waited out its foreign occupations and will do so again. Australia has better things to do with our military and our money.

There might be good reasons for getting out of Afghanistan, but I'm not sure Dr Broinowski has listed any here. More...

Guest blogger: David Knoll researches US foreign policy in Washington, DC, and served as research assistant for former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s last book, ‘Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West.’

The CIA recently accused Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence of having ties to militant groups in Afghanistan, possibly including those responsible for the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. The Pakistani spy agency, always at the center of any intrigue, has had a tumultuous relationship with the CIA, and the most recent accusations serve as a good illustration of one of Pakistan's central problems: conflicted national identity. 

Having just returned from a week long wedding in Karachi, I saw how longstanding questions of identity, first raised during the Indian independence movement from Britain, remain firmly entrenched. More...