The goal of the Government's glossy Strategic Development Plan 2011-30 is to transform Timor-Leste into an upper-middle income country in less than twenty years. There are plans for seven universities, high-speed internet throughout a land that currently has intermittent electricity, food supply exceeding demand, a universal social security system, an extensive network of land and marine national parks, a national ring-road and a law regulating almost every conceivable practice and behaviour. 

National self-confidence is high; Finance Minister Emilia Pires is likening the tiny nation to an Asian economic powerhouse. In 2010, she told the travel and lifestyle magazine Monocle, 'If the first decade of the 21st century was dominated by China then I feel the second decade will be for Timor-Leste'.

The question, however, is whether today's smiles and good times are a temporary bubble inflated by oil and gas revenues or the start of something more permanent. More on that in a follow-up post.

Photo by Flickr user US Pacific Fleet.

Source:  International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. 

The best way to deal with this situation is simply to report both figures: the US is growing more slowly but becoming richer than China. Yet most analyses of US decline, including Thirlwell's, only report growth rates. 

It's not hard to see how defining decline in terms of growth rates produces nonsensical results. Over the past twenty years, more than half the countries in the world grew faster than the US, including such titans as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Rwanda. Moreover, by Thirlwell's definition, the US has been in decline to China since 1968, during the Cultural Revolution and over a decade before Reform and Opening. 

The problem with growth rates is that they compare countries to their former selves. China's growth rates are high in large part because its starting point was low. For this reason, Harvard political scientists Sheena Chestnut and Alistair Iain Johnston contend, 'it strains the concept...to characterize any state with a faster growth rate than the United States as a rising power. This does not fit with a commonsensical notion of rising power.' 

One can argue that comparing growth rates helps account for potential diminishing returns of wealth. For example, Georgetown political scientist Erik Voeten recently asserted 'it is much easier for a country with a GDP per capita of 30K to bully a country with a GDP per capita of 1K than it is for a country with a GDP per capita of 50K to bully a country with a GDP per capita of 15K.'

Perhaps. But one can also imagine the opposite being true. Highly developed countries may get more bang for the buck than less developed countries – that is, every dollar they spend on innovation, military capabilities, international influence, etc. produces greater returns. This idea of increasing returns to wealth fits with the standard conception of economic development as efficiency of production and is supported by studies showing that more developed countries are better able to translate their basic resources, or 'latent power', into actual capabilities (for examples, see here, here, here and here).

Obviously, growth rates should not be ignored. They provide an important data point and allow us to make educated guesses about the future. But neither should they be conflated with total growth nor used to define loaded terms like 'decline' or 'catch-up'.

One last point. China is growing faster but falling behind the US across most indicators. But in terms of GDP, China is growing faster and closing the gap – by most projections, China's GDP will overtake America's sometime in the next decade or two. Most analysts view this impending GDP transition as a looming power transition. And Thirlwell places a great deal of emphasis on GDP in his post.   

To be sure, GDP figures serve a vital function in defining the set of potential major powers – Luxembourg is extremely wealthy in per capita terms, but its small population precludes it from raising an army, let alone entering the ranks of the great powers. But beyond this basic function, GDP figures can mislead more than they illuminate, at least in certain cases. China is one of these cases.

It is often forgotten that China had the largest GDP for the first half of its 'century of humiliation' (1839-1945) when it was torn apart by Western powers and Japan. The UK, on the other hand, ruled a quarter of the globe during the 19th century, but was never, even at its peak, the largest economy in the world. The figures below show GDP and GDP per capita figures for 1870. The data on GDP per capita matches much better with our understanding of which countries were powerful in 1870.

Source:  Maddison, Statistics on World GDP. 

China is obviously not as weak today as it was in 1870. But much of the case for the rise of China and the decline of the US rests on GDP figures, so it's important to recognise that GDP has never been a good proxy for national power or aggregate wealth. GDP is largely a function of population, and people are both assets and a liabilities because they both produce and consume resources. China's 1.3 billion people produce much output, but they also consume most of it immediately, leaving little wealth for national purposes. 

GDP figures help define the potential major powers. But when you're comparing two big contenders like the US and China, GDP per capita becomes a much more important measure because it represents how developed each country's economy is and how much surplus wealth is available for national purposes. By that measure, along with more specific measures of innovative and military capacity, the US is rising relative to China, at least for now.

Photo by Flickr user papalars. 

Second, if you define interest groups in a broader way, we can also find interest groups inside civil society. For example, trade promotion associations, especially in south China, are really strong. Sometimes they can capture the government and are so influential in showing their voice and influencing decision-making.

But I think a characteristic of Chinese interest groups is that they're very unbalanced. In Western countries, there are many kinds of interest groups, representing every area including companies, workers, women – every area. In China, you can only find interest groups which represent some kinds of people; there are no interest groups which represent disadvantaged people. Interest groups in China are organised in an unbalanced, un-natural way which is highly related to policy because the government tries to promote some kinds of organisations and to control others.

Julian Fu: How has the Arab Spring affected the tone of civil society in China?

I think it's an interesting thing that the first official reports tried to avoid this topic. If you look at CCTV or official reports, you'll see very little information. They tried to escape the topic. In that way, the Arab Spring was not so influential because for many people who got information from official channels, they knew what happened but it was hard to know the real meaning or to form clear opinions.

I think in China internet users are a huge group. That means many people can get information from the internet, and even to jump over the government's 'great firewall'. I think that, in that way, the Arab Spring may have some influence in people's minds, even if it didn't lead to action.

If you look at what people say on the internet, you may find that people fall into two groups. One group, with many young or well-educated people, think this is a democratic wave, looking at how other countries can be affected and wonder what might happen in China, but they're just saying that – they don't do anything.

Another group is represented by websites such as 'Utopia' (wuyouzhixiang). They think that this is a lesson for China. For them, the financial crisis in Western countries is a lesson to China, as is the Arab Spring. According to them, we should learn from these lessons and take action to stop this happening in China. I think this also represents the opinions of many in government. It has probably benefited the left in China because now they have a true reason, a very real reason to stress Party rule.

Julian Fu: Do you expect expect the Xi Jinping administration's attitude toward civil society (particularly online communities) to be different from the Hu administration's?

I think it's very hard to predict what Xi Jinping will do because in China, there's a rule that you won't really know the face of a leader until he's really in power. Sometimes people hide their true purpose but might want to do something quite worthwhile. His only purpose now is to secure his position.

But my own opinion is that I don't expect him to do much reform to push civil society forward. I think Xi may do something less radical, not involving a change of the current orientation. Whether or not he will depend on civil society depends on what people really want. If there is strong social demand, he will have to make some reform, but if he can find a more gentle way like the 'Chongqing model' to calm social tensions then he won't have a strong incentive to reform.

Peter and Nathan: What do you think of the Chongqing model?

I think the Chongqing model might benefit the people to a certain extent, but it won't be a good solution because of China's power structure. To me, I believe that if citizens give up their power, maybe they can expect a good leader to give them some benefits for a certain purpose, but they can't expect a leader always to do things for them. So as long as power is concentrated with the government or with one organisation, it's not good news for the common people. I don't trust the power structure in the Chongqing model, but to a certain extent, people have benefited from it.

Brian P Teubner: Do you believe Chinese NGOs will be politically capable of standing up to Communist Party policy decisions in the future?

That depends on what you mean by the future. If China develops in a stable way, in ten or twenty years, civil society in China will be quite influential and people can have their voice in public policy and even change the power structure. But I think now China's development model is a high-speed model with high risk so we can hardly expect sustainable development for 20 years.

I think it's quite possible in less than 20 years, even in 5 years, it will see some hard changes. Anything can happen and the civil society will not just go forward as rapidly as today. Civil society may even go backwards. It's hard to predict. At the current time, I think the voice of civil society is rather weak in China's power structure. It's stronger than five years ago, but still it's quite weak if we look at the whole society. It's still a society dominated by state power, by the Party and the government, with very little citizen power and very few self-governing actors.

Peter and Nathan: what do you think of the growth of mass incidents in China?

I think mass incidents are one of the greatest risks in China. If the power structure won't change, then social conflict will escalate. When social tensions become higher and conflict escalates, there will be more need for government control. When there is more government control and more power is given to the authorities, there will be more problems in society. Then, there will be more mass incidents.

I think many mass incidents arise because of no due procedure in the administration system. There is too much personal judgment and behaviour. This becomes a negative cycle. Mass incidents will become a greater risk unless there is political reform, but increasing mass incidents also make reform more difficult by making the Party concentrate power. This is really a problem for China.

How can we break this negative cycle? I think Guangdong has tried to explore a solution. They've tried to find a model. The Wukan case is a good example. Guandong's leaders have tried to use more open and reasonable attitudes to deal with these kinds of problems rather than just controlling the village with high power. The results were very good. When the government says that people's demands are reasonable, people's demands will become reasonable too. So Wukan is a very good case for solving the problem. But the Wukan case was highly dependent on the particular leadership there. In China's current political framework, this kind of leadership is very hard to develop. Except in a few places like Guangdong, these kind of things won't happen. So the Wukan place might not be applicable to other areas.

In his own post-war, post-Nuremburg memoir 'Lost Victories', Manstein commented that an argument against senior officer resignation was that a senior military commander 'is no more able to pack up his bags and go home than any other soldier' and 'the soldier in the field is not in the pleasant position of a politician who is always at liberty to climb off the bandwagon when things go wrong or the line taken by the government does not suit him. A soldier has to fight where and when he is ordered'.

The Petraeus parallel emerged from an apparently well-researched extract in the Washington Post about the negotiations leading up to Obama's Afghan drawdown. The extract came from a recently published book by Paula Broadwell called 'All In: The Education of General David Petraeus'.

The extract addressed the period 2009-11 when President Obama considered and then announced the withdrawal of the 33,000 surge troops from Afghanistan. His final decision was to withdraw 10,000 surge troops by the end of 2011 and, against the advice of his generals and his Secretary of Defense, to withdraw the balance by the end of the US summer in 2012.

I have expressed the view that President Obama made this decision for self-serving political reasons — the US presidential elections at the end of 2012. The consequence was to be that the President denied his generals the full 2012 fighting season with the majority of their troops, thus significantly increasing the risk of failure in Afghanistan.

Many, including the extraordinarily influential General Jack_Keane, who was also a mentor to Petraeus, advised Petraeus to resign because President Obama's decision 'not only protracts the war but risks the mission'. In the extract, Petraeus is reported to have emailed back: 'I don't think quitting would serve our country...More likely to create a crisis. And, I told POTUS I'd support his ultimate decision. Besides, the troops can't quit...'

It was this last statement about the troops that caught my attention because it was the same as used by Manstein. At the time, Petraeus had been nominated as Director CIA and in his confirmation hearings he repeated his view:

Our troopers don't get to quit, and I don't think commanders should contemplate that, again, as any kind of idle action. That would be an extraordinary action, in my view. And at the end of the day, this is not about me...This is about our country. And the best step for our country, with the commander in chief having made a decision, is to execute that decision to the very best of our ability.

Of course the two situations are vastly different. For Nazi Germany, it was a war of national survival. For this president, Afghanistan is a remote campaign which, in his view, does not directly threaten US essential interests. And of course the two national leaders, Hitler and Obama, are not comparable in any meaningful way at all. But the importance of alignment of national policy through strategy to the tactical level is as important as it ever was. And if there is a clash, it is the general that steps down.

Having not taken his generals' advice, it is now indisputable that the war in Afghanistan is Obama's war. But I wonder if Petraeus, for all the responsibility that he had as commander in Afghanistan, made time to read the newly published Manstein book.

In Burma's case, the regime responded by developing strong ties with China and improving relations with a wide range of other countries. These steps severely undercut the West's punitive measures. When the Obama Administration reviewed US policy toward Burma in 2009, it concluded that sanctions were at best 'modest inconveniences' to the military government.

A third issue is the importance of strategic imperatives. One reason the US, the EU and like-minded countries adopted a policy towards Burma that was much tougher than any directed at other undemocratic countries in Asia was because they felt there were few critical national interests at stake. After the 1988 uprising, Burma was seen as isolated, weak and of little commercial or strategic value. It was thus deemed a cost-free target.

Yet, as the years went by, Burma's critical geostrategic position and role became clearer. It was able to play China off against India, and by joining ASEAN became a factor in regional diplomacy. It was a factor in international efforts against transnational crime, and its ties to North Korea raised the spectre of nuclear and missile proliferation. Also, Burma possessed vast energy resources, making it critical to its neighbours' economic development.

Fourthly, the steady expansion of the regime's power and influence, in the face of constant external pressure, illustrates the danger of formulating foreign policies without objectively assessing their likely impact. The Bush Administration's principled stand against Burma's military government was applauded by many, but was pursued despite clear evidence that it would not achieve its stated objectives.

Indeed, the punitive measures and harsh rhetoric aimed at Burma after 1988 aroused the generals' nationalist sentiments and made them determined to resist external intervention. They strengthened the armed forces and may have even considered WMD. Foreign pressure also helped justify their bunker mentality, and made them even more fearful of political, economic and social change.

Granted, those countries favouring a policy of engagement did not have much success either. China was closest to Burma during this period but it struggled to influence the attitudes of Senior General Than Shwe and his circle. ASEAN too was unable to make much of an impact. The regime put its survival and Burma's stability, unity and independence — as perceived by Naypyidaw — above all other considerations.

It is also worth noting the impact that notable individuals have had on Burma's foreign relations. During the Bush era, for example, Western policy owed a great deal to Aung San Suu Kyi. It has yet to be seen whether Thein Sein deserves the title 'Burma's Gorbachev', but his elevation to the presidency appears to have broken the diplomatic impasse between Burma and Western countries.

Arguably, President Obama could be included in this category. Despite strong opposition, he adopted a more nuanced US approach to Burma that emphasised dialogue and cautious engagement, rather than criticism and punishment. This opened the way for the incremental restoration of bilateral ties, in contrast to the Bush policy which, for many years, called for nothing less than complete regime change. 

In 2010, senior US officials acknowledged that the new policy had failed as far as a constructive dialogue with Naypyidaw was concerned. However, had Obama given up and reverted to Bush's discredited policies, as many members of Congress and activists demanded, Washington would not have been in a position to respond as promptly and positively as it did to the diplomatic openings that emerged last year.

Now that a reform process has begun and there is the possibility of far-reaching changes in Burma, the international community can play a much greater role. Both Naypidaw and other governments will remain wary of each other and proceed cautiously. However, foreign countries and multilateral organisations are in a position to help Burma and it is in everyone's interests that they do so.

For the best way to consolidate recent changes and encourage further reform is to help make the current process successful. There will still be differences of view (for example, over the 2008 constitution) and the provision of large-scale assistance to Burma will pose its own challenges. But for the time being, the aims of the government, the opposition movement and the international community appear to be broadly aligned.

As Aung San Suu Kyi told the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, this offers 'a rare and extremely precious opportunity'.

Thirlwell outlines two models: the 'fixed stock' and the 'opportunity cost' paradigms. Yet both potentially overlook a significant aspect of World3's 'overshoot and collapse' scenario. However much Forrester and the Meadows experimented with its parameters, World3's 'overshoot and collapse' scenario always occurred during the time-period of 2030-2100. Changing the model's assumptions simply altered when the scenario would occur.

The 1980 bet between Ehrlich and Simon is a great media sound-bite. However, the reality also was that commodities traders including Michael Marcus and Bruce Kovner of Caxton Corporation and Paul Tudor Jones made fortunes on the market volatility during this period — which Sebastian Mallaby details in the opening chapters of his book More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite.

LtG has many legacies. It foreshadowed the contemporary interest in resource wars, environmental and energy security, and catastrophic risk. LtG's early simulation modelling led directly to Stella's iThink and other system dynamics programs like Vensim. The second episode of the Adam Curtis documentary series All Watched Over By Machines of Loving Grace (2011) credits LtG with galvanising environmental activists and non-government organisations to debate elite policy-makers. The third episode notes that the logistics and supply chain for consumer electronics like Sony's PlayStation 3 and Apple's iPhone is closely connected to current resource wars and near-failed states in Africa.

The search for solutions to LtG's limits has led to other innovation initiatives, such as those in the book Massive Change, whose authors Bruce Mau with Jennifer Leonard and the Institute Without Boundaries were influenced by designer R Buckminster Fuller. The drafters of future Australian Government white papers could learn something from LtG's impacts.

Public opinion in general though is increasingly important. When something happens, and public opinion spreads across the whole of society, then it can create real pressure. This kind of pressure means that the Government has to take public opinion into account. We can even find some examples of the Government changing its opinion, even in the wrong direction, but following public opinion. For example, lawyers might look at a case in a very professional way, but public opinion can be extremely emotional and the final decision of a judge might be influenced by this kind of emotion. In these kinds of cases, it's hard to say whether it's good or not.

Weh Yeoh: With the rise of the power of the netizen in China, do you see the increased resistance and criticism of the Government on the web as being able to translate into real action and change in the way China is governed?

That's a good question because websites have become so powerful in China. People may say the internet, especially micro-blogs, have become the first influential social force in China. I would say as long as there is a high social voice on the internet, there must be an influence on public policy or decision-making process, but the Government has also learned to deal with such opinions and has tried to 'guide' them.

In some other cases, if people use the internet with the strong intention of doing something specific, it can be effective. For example, the Xiamen PX project. This was one of the first cases where people came together and went to demonstrate. They were connected by the internet. It's hard to identify the leader because there was no leader. People just delivered their messages online. People went to the same place at the same time and demonstrated, even though we don't call them demonstrations because demonstrations are not legal in China. We just call it 'taking a walk together'. This has also happened in Shanghai and other cities. In these kinds of cases, public opinion can be most efficient because people have a very strong interest in doing something.

Enrico Fardella: Can we imagine a future where the internet takes the place of the parliament as a filter between the masses and the leadership?

I think I wouldn't say the internet could play the role of a parliament because parliament is organised and has formal power in the decision-making process. The internet is much more loosely organised and it doesn't have formal power. It doesn't have voting procedures; it cannot make decisions. People can just show their opinions.

The internet plays a role more like a 'public space'. People can learn to express themselves. This is a very important ability, where people have very little experience or ability in China. We don't have this training in school or university, but the internet is a good way for people to learn to express themselves, and then to listen to others, to discuss with others and be tolerant of others' opinions.

Peter and Nathan: Do you think the internet in China is tolerant?

Not so tolerant, but the internet itself has some characteristics of tolerance. Unless you are the forum manager, you can't delete others' posts. You have to see other people's opinions there and you need to learn that there are many voices in the world, not just one voice like you're told in school. In school, you're told there's one answer, the right answer. On the internet, people can learn that there is sometimes no right answer, just noise, and you try to persuade others of your opinion even if you can't be successful.

Within self-imposed limits, the reform process appears to be real. Close observers with direct access to key players, including Thein Sein himself, are convinced that the President is genuine in his wish to introduce a wide range of new and more enlightened policies and to bring greater peace and prosperity to Burma. Significantly, this view is shared by Aung San Suu Kyi, who perhaps more than anyone else has reason to be cautious about accepting the Government's statements at face value.

The changes seen in Burma during 2011 are largely the result of internal developments — notably Senior General Than Shwe's retirement, the advent of the Thein Sein Government and Aung San Suu Kyi's willingness to work with the new President. Despite the rather unseemly scramble by some foreign governments, activist groups and individuals to claim credit for aspects of the reform program, forces outside Burma have contributed only marginally to this outcome. 

The task facing Thein Sein is daunting. After more than 50 years of brutal, inept and ideologically distorted military rule, there is hardly a single sector of Burma's government, economy and civil society that is not begging for reform and desperate for financial, technical and other kinds of assistance. Some steps can be taken quickly and relatively painlessly, but the depth and complexity of the challenges faced by Burma are such that fundamental reform will take considerable time, effort and resources.

The most intractable problem confronting Thein Sein is the gulf between Naypyidaw and the ethnic minorities. Generations of war, human rights abuse, economic exploitation and broken promises have left the minorities deeply distrustful of the Burman-dominated central government. For their part, the Government and armed forces remain determined not to compromise — as they see it — Burma's unity, stability and independence. Some progress has been made but a durable solution seems a distant prospect.

Another important question is whether Naypyidaw can manage popular expectations. After decades of hardship and disappointment, few Burmese are taking anything for granted, but according to recent visitors to Burma, the population is increasingly hopeful of real reforms and an improvement in their standard of living. Having Aung San Suu Kyi on side should help Thein Sein keep these hopes within realistic limits but already there have been demands for faster and more far-reaching changes.

Given Burma's recent history and current problems, Naypyidaw's critics will be able to point to issues of concern for some time yet. In parts of the country, military operations are continuing. Officials used to wielding unbridled authority will not change their behaviour overnight. Corruption, discrimination and the abuse of power have become deeply embedded in Burmese society. And in some ways Naypyidaw is being held to a standard higher than that applied to other regional governments. Even if he had a firmer power base and greater resources, Thein Sein would not be able to satisfy everyone.

The reform program has considerable momentum, and even if it falters it will be difficult to turn the clock back to 2010. But the President needs to balance competing political pressures while taking account of Burma's limited ability to implement and absorb rapid change. His aim — in the short term, at least — seems to be something along Chinese lines, namely a prosperous and independent country with a measure of individual freedom, exercised within the framework of a restrictive constitution.

For her part, Aung San Suu Kyi is facing the challenge posed to all popular leaders, of making the transition from political icon to effective politician. For the time being, she seems prepared to work with Thein Sein in achieving national reconciliation and incremental reform. This is a pragmatic strategy but it carries risks. It has already upset some of her supporters. It will also be difficult to sustain. For there will come a time when pressure will build for Burma's 'disciplined democracy' to give way to a genuinely representative system of government. That may prove the real test of the President's reform program.

Indeed, as he mentions, important elements of that engagement have even diminished in recent times. Of course the relationship with China has burgeoned with the resources boom, Chinese investment here and efforts by both sides to seek fuller and more sympathetic understanding. But the relationship with Japan has probably slipped back a little and our capabilities in relation to the whole region from north to south (two billion-plus people and perhaps more than half the global economy) has not increased.

Why are Asian languages, history etc less studied here now than twenty years ago? Why is there still so little Australian export business from Australia to those countries not requiring our iron ore, coal etc? And so little Australian investment? Grenville asks these questions and others, like the relative paucity of Asian coverage in our media.

At one level, the answer is easy: for 90% of Australians these countries, their languages, cultures and histories are much more foreign than those of Europe and the Americas. Despite geography, they are less accessible.

Why have the necessary steps not been taken to overcome these obstacles? It has not been for lack of trying by major institutions such as the Australian National University and relevant parts of other universities, some elements of the federal government and of state governments. We have had some prime ministers and foreign ministers who appeared genuinely interested and what is now DFAT has been on the job for a long time now (its present Secretary was Head of the Political Section in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in the early 1980s). But DFAT's resources have been cut back further and further and the information and cultural capacities slashed. Only the consular services (which attract public attention and where ministers want at all costs to avoid vulnerability) are fairly adequately funded.

In times of stringency, governments are unlikely to make expensive efforts in the face of public apathy. Nor can government in Australia do much to alleviate the often rather squalid image of Australia generated by some of our tourism to places like Bali and Phuket. What we need is a major national soul-search on the relationship with Asia. Good luck to you, Dr Henry!

Photo by Flickr user mikaku.

The irony is of course that, now the pirates are running 'de-facto' security arrangements off the immediate coast of the Horn, fish stocks have replenished and boomed back into life. Unfortunately, piracy is a far more lucrative trade and fisherman of the past are no longer tempted to return to their own trade! Another tick-in-the-box for preventative action staving off policy crises; underlined by the inability of policymakers to follow through on preventative action (lack of funds, infrastructure, predictability of outcomes, or pure political will?).

The tax collection has been very substantial. Our target over the last couple of years was to increase tax collection by 0.5% of GDP per annum. That has largely been achieved. Secondly, many multilateral agencies are starting to give grants rather than loans starting in the early 2000s. That has reduced the debt to 32% from 62% of GDP in 2003. The budget deficit, which is audited by the IMF/World Bank, has gone done from 7% in the 80s and early 90s to 3.5% of GDP. Even during the armed conflict, Nepal had very good macroeconomic stability and indicators have improved significantly.

The main problem is to increase GDP growth rate. During the armed conflict period, we had only 3.5% growth rate per annum. It has improved slightly but not dramatically. We have the capability to very easily increase it to 6-7% with the resources available within the country. But, because of political instability, we are lagging behind. So, we want to see more improvement, especially in agriculture, hydro power, and tourism. We also want to be the centre for outsourcing of services, especially from India and China.

Nepal maintains its currency peg with India. Do you see any changes to this arrangement arising out of your increased focus on other export markets, particularly China as a result of your upcoming improvements to your infrastructure links with Tibet?

The reason that Nepal has a currency peg with India is because of the trade and investment relationship and day-to-day economic transactions because of open borders. India remains the largest investor in Nepal at 2/3 of our trade. The people who are in the east, west, and south who are along the open borders benefit from that. So, I think that we will maintain it.

The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in India recently published a piece outlining the political cost of Nepali Prime Minister Baburam Battarai's signing of a landmark Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with India. Do you see broad domestic political consensus for the Indian BIPPA moving forward and why do you think that such a backlash occurred in the first place?

Nepal is politically heterogeneous at this time. I am sure there is opposition that wants to make a point on it. But, this is not the first BIPPA. Nepal has already done BIPPAs with other countries and intends to do more beyond India. If we do not protect investment in the country, how can we promote investment in Nepal? We have some problems with political stability, electricity, and labour. But, the whole point here is that it has improved. We need to see things in perspective. The Maoists, the party who were outside the political system, are leading the government and have been instrumental in signing the BIPPA agreement.

But, even within the Maoist party, there has been dissension on the BIPPA. Is there even political cohesion in the party running the country at this point and what does that mean for investment?

It is not just on the BIPPA; there are so many other issues within the party. I think there are problems in major political parties. But, the bigger the party, then we will see it more often. And, it comes out in the papers explicitly, I guess. But, we also have internal party problems in other political parties. What we have to see is how much support other political parties have for BIPPA. All of the political parties are supporting it and the Government has already done it. It is the political decision of the country, not one political party.

During the armed conflict, it was difficult for Nepal to focus on regional free trade initiatives. Now that the conflict is over, free trade promotion could be an impetus for economic growth. From Nepal's perspective, how is regional free trade in South Asia progressing? And, do you see any major breakthroughs on the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in the next few years?

Even after the implementation of SAFTA, we have not seen a huge improvement in free trade. We should not be limited to this small amount. It can be expanded to investment areas and the service sector. We need to do more to reduce sensitive items to improve trade in the region. So much more can be done. Pakistan has agreed to give most-favoured-nation status to Indian goods. That will have a significant impact in improving intra-regional trade. If India and Pakistan have better relations, SAFTA will benefit.

We also remain focused on the WTO Doha round. There are few remaining issues in the non-agriculture sector. We would like to see the services area, especially labour, included in the future because we are the net exporter of labour in certain sectors. Negotiations have begun in that area. As one of the least developed countries, we also would like to be given special and differential treatment extended to more areas to see if aid for trade can help Nepal remove the supply constraint.

Extended discussions from the interview can be found here and here. Photo by Flickr user rajkumar1220.

India's response to Iran's nuclear program has been muted. On the one hand, it has consistently voted in favour of sanctions at the UN over the past decade. On the other, it has been conspicuously quiet about recent moves to target Iran's oil exports to put further pressure on the regime. While China, Japan and South Korea, as well as the European Union, have all had high-profile dialogues with the US on this issue, India has sat on the sidelines.

Does this silence signal an intention by India to undermine America's containment of Iran, as Mr Bhadrakumar suggested to India Today? 

Some Indian commentators would no doubt like an opportunity to teach the US a lesson. Standing up to Washington on Iran, they imply, would show the Americans that India is not to be taken for granted. For these analysts, in other words, the Iran issue is a test of India's 'strategic autonomy'.

The more likely explanation is more prosaic: New Delhi is quiet because it is hoping the storm will blow over before it has to make any difficult decisions.

India's dilemma is a very serious one. On the one hand, cutting off oil supplies from Iran and pushing up fuel prices will slow an already weakening economy even further. On the other, letting Iran acquire a weapon with which to threaten American and Israeli interests, not to mention the four million Indian citizens working in the Gulf, is also an unhappy prospect.

India is not the only state in a difficult position on Iran, but which way it decides to move will be significant in signaling how the crisis over Iran's nuclear program will be resolved. India's elite know their Iranian counterparts well. President Ahmadinejad briefly visited New Delhi in March 2011; an invitation has been extended for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to reciprocate, following a mission to Tehran by the Indian Foreign Secretary last July. There are, in other words, few countries better positioned than India to read Iranian intentions.

Photo by Flickr user slmp.co.uk.

Ruak has many devout followers, and at the centre of his campaign is an individual more accustomed to pestering politicians than working for them. Jose Antonio Belo is a man now on his third act. He was a former trusted messenger for Ruak during the resistance, and was jailed for faxing information about Indonesian atrocities to international human rights groups, before becoming a journalist.

Belo was a long-time editor-in-chief of Tempo Semanal, a boisterous weekly newspaper and website that exposed the petty and not so petty corruptions and abuses of power in the post-independence governments. He has published page after page of allegations about craven civil servants and ministers and tales of missing money, suspicious rice contracts, and apparent contraventions of procurement laws.

One minister even charged him with criminal defamation and tried to throw him in jail. His tough, shared history with the men in the mountains probably acted as his own good luck charm to keep him safe then and now he's repaying the debt to a man he says has clean hands, a clear mind and the nation's best interest at heart.

Matan Ruak's chief political adviser looks like a person just as likely be found waxing intellectual in a lecture theatre as spearheading an electoral campaign. In his early thirties, Fidelis Magalhaes was educated at leading universities in London, Lisbon and Hawaii and has deferred his PhD in international relations in Australia to work on this campaign. His job is to help prepare the manifesto and prep the candidate on a range of political issues.

On the surface, he seems an unlikely adviser to a military man, but he avers that Matan Ruak is not your traditional commander. He likes to listen and relishes debate and people disagreeing with him, attributes that are extremely unusual in this deeply hierarchical political culture.

Eduardo Soares Belo and Gregorio Saldanha complete the campaign administration. Eduardo is a former guerrilla fighter, current head of the country's largest private security firm and leading businessmen; Indonesia jailed Gregorio for many years for helping organise the 12 November 1991 demonstration, which became infamous throughout the world as the Santa Cruz Massacre.

Other supporters are odd bedfellows. Some of the former soldiers who mutinied against Matan Ruak in 2006 are helping out his campaign in some rural districts, as is Rai Los, the former head of a shady paramilitary force. Belo claims that other groups which still do not necessarily like each other are reconciling for the purpose of supporting Matan Ruak's candidature. The involvement of these men is a powerful psychological communication of forgiveness, says Magalhaes, a way of stitching together recent wounds in a still traumatized society. The two men say that supporters of political parties are peeling away from their traditional groupings to support Ruak.

Whether consciously or unconsciously, the campaign mimics a classic move in US politics: run as a fresh-faced newcomer no matter how much of an insider you actually are. Taur Matan Ruak is outside the system now but he has been a central figure in Timorese politics long before independence in May 2002. He was the last commander of FALINTIL fighters and the first leader of the Timorese Defence Force; he is 'a highly respected leader' according to a leaked US embassy cable published by Wikileaks. This may be his first tilt for elected office but he is a consummate insider.

It will be a crowded pack. Other reputed runners in the race include Deputy Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres; Speaker of the National Parliament Fernando 'La Sama' de Araujo; ageing eminence Francisco Xavier Amaral, who was president during Timor-Leste's short-lived independence in 1975; and Rogerio Lobato, the former minister of the interior jailed for illegally distributing weapons in 2006 to none other than Mr Rai Los.

FRETILIN, the largest party in the parliament, has nominated Francisco Guterres, 'Lu Olo', another man with strong resistance credentials and who was pipped at the post during the last campaign. So far there is only one female candidate, Angela Freitas, who says Matan Ruak should be barred from running because the 2006 UN Commission of Inquiry recommended that he be prosecuted for distributing weapons to civilians (the case was subsequently dropped because the prosecutor determined there was a lack of evidence). More candidates are expected to join the race soon. President Jose Ramos-Horta has yet to decide whether he will compete; he says his supporters have gathered 100,000 signatures urging him to run.

In the absence of polling, it is impossible to know how each candidate stacks up against the others.

For 'Team Success' the future is not assured. Active and dynamic coalitions can whip up enthusiasm and support but also have the potential to quickly become uncontrollable, squabbling messes. Volunteers eventually need to get recompensed and the initial innocent lustre of any campaign could get quickly tarnished in the no-holds-barred world of Timorese politics. One MP has spoken of having received death threats in connection with the presidential campaign. Candidates can over-promise and leave their followers frustrated.

But these are all problems for the future. On this sunny day in Dili, the 'Team Success' dream remains pristine.

Photo by Flickr user Rui Miguel da Silva Pinto.

Alex Burns:

There are several possible reasons for the high response rate of self-identified constructivists in the survey of US international relations scholars. A younger generation of IR scholars have been influenced by Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, John Ruggie, Martha Finnemore, Friedrich Kratochwil, and other constructivists. Professional associations have changed: the Perestroika Movement created a debate in the American Political Science Association about epistemic assumptions and research methodology, whilst the International Studies Association now hosts conference sessions on critical security studies and similar topics. However, realism still remains influential, through the enduring influence of Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt. The survey response to 'I do not use paradigmatic analysis' might include diplomatic historians and scholars who use inter-paradigmatic and multi-perspectival approaches.

Gyngell and Wesley's observation about DFAT staff who are self-identified realists follows an historical trend in Australian policymaking. Several contributors to Graeme Cheeseman and Bruce Roberts' critical anthology Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers (Allen & Unwin, 1996) complained that Australian defence and security policymaking was realist-dominated and that scholars from other traditions had few opportunities to influence or shape policymaking. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University was usually singled out as the institutional villain. This past debate suggests a disconnect between Australian scholars and policymakers.

This scholar-policymaker disconnect plays out in the media, academia and in formulating specific strategies. Consider counter-terrorism. The 2006-08 campaign by James Cook University's Mervyn F Bendle in Quadrant and The Australian about 'terrorism studies' was essentially a disagreement between a realist and critical theory-influenced academics. There was little discussion of what was actually being taught in 'terrorism studies' courses. Australia's Counter-Terrorism White Paper (2010) conceptualised terrorism in a similar fashion to debates within the Bush Administration in 2003-05, but didn't appear to include 'lessons learned' from researchers in Monash University's Global Terrorism Centre, the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, and similar academic groups. Over the past decade, Australian Research Council grants awarded in defence, counter-terrorism and security have reflected the visibility and perceived urgency of topics — there are more opportunities for collaborative research teams.

What insights can constructivists share with DFAT and the Defence Department? Ideas matter. Institutions and non-state actors are important. Diplomacy and intelligence are crucial for dealing with ideational factors like culture, history, identity, and threat perception. These insights are echoed in recent non-constructivist work on perceiving enemies and strategic culture (Patrick Porter's Military Orientalism); how the US Army and Marines developed new counter-insurgency doctrines (David Ucko's The New Counterinsurgency Era); effective psychological operations (Ron Schleifer's Psychological Warfare in the Intifada); decisions about nuclear weapons development (Jacques EC Hymans' The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation), and diffusion of military innovations (Michael Horowitz's The Diffusion of Military Power). Constructivist insights can be seen in how the US State Department dealt with the Arab Spring and in the Obama administration's Sustaining US Global Leadership (2012) which echoes John F Kennedy's 'flexible response' period. Theory can inform more robust and resilient policy formulation. But academics need to heed US Secretary of State George Marshall's advice to grand strategist George Kennan: 'Avoid trivia.'

NAJ Taylor:

You're certainly right — these results are astonishing. 

You highlight the unexpectedly low results for Realism and highlight some valid reasons why Constructivism is becoming so prominent (though I am assuming this figure contains a high percentage of Realists if one was to limit Constructivism to interpretive approaches — put more crudely, there's bound to be a significant number of 'Realists in drag' contained in that figure).

However, for me what more astonishing is that more US-based IR scholars identify themselves as being capable of conducting research 'paradigmatically'. Some would rightly question whether this is even possible, unless of course we view politics not justs as a 'science', where empirical tests can be conducted, but where personal and established beliefs, ideas, reflections and values have no influence over our work as IR scholars.

If I've read the study correctly, it is no wonder IR scholars have little direct policy influence — it seems to me 'we' try to hard to be relevant to policy, without even acknowledging privately how difficult the replication of scientific methods is for those interested in the study of human society. 

In China's Maoist period, civil and public life was dominated almost exclusively by the Communist Party, a situation made possible as a result of the CCP's absolute control over political and economic resources in China and its provision of welfare for many of China's citizens. The onset of economic reforms after 1978, however, stimulated the growth of a wide variety of social groups which expanded to fill the vacuum let by the retreat of the state: student groups, debating societies, trade unions, labour groups, women's associations and so on. Despite official restrictions, these groups proliferated, especially in academic centres, brining an unprecedented degree of open debate and pluralism in the People's Republic.

When this openness culminated in the protests of 1989, however, the development of Chinese civil society suffered a substantial setback. Restrictions on independent social organisations were strengthened in the wake of the June 1989 crackdown and continued to be strengthened periodically throughout the 1990s.

Despite these tightened restrictions, civil society continued to grow and develop throughout the 1990s. Indeed, the sheer complexity of China's developing market economy and practical restrictions on the reach of the state have made it impossible to shape Chinese society to the extent the CCP would like to. It has relied, instead, on a complex web of legislation which attempts to regulate the development of social organisations and occasional crack-downs on religious or political groups such as Falun Gong which it deems too dangerous to tolerate. 

We're excited to see your questions about civil society in China. You can submit your questions here: blogeditor@lowyinstitute.org .

Photo by Flickr user Stuck in Customs.

Statistics aside, the quality of India's higher education system is lacking in global competitiveness, with only one Indian university rating among Asia's best, according to the 2011-2012 Times Higher Education Ranking.

India's 2009 Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act is a big step towards guaranteeing a basic education for every child, despite concerns over its implementation. However, education alone will not be enough – India needs to create employment for its swiftly growing labour force. It has been estimated that in order to accommodate the 100 million workers that will join India's workforce between 2015 and 2050, roughly 250 million jobs must be created to achieve full employment.

At a more basic level, India must work at improving the overall health and wellbeing of its children in order to make the most of their immense potential. Rajat M Nag of the Asian Development Bank estimates that 37% of India's population lives below the poverty line, and India is home to one-third of the world's poor. At 69 deaths per 1000 live births, India's under-five mortality rate is high, and 47% of children under five are malnourished. 

The World Bank notes a direct link between undernourishment and impaired cognitive development, and this may have dire implications for India's future productivity and development. With a Human Development Indicators ranking of 134 out of 187 countries, India must focus on developing the potential of its enormous human capital, which will in turn translate into favourable economic outcomes.

India's demographic dividend is expected to level off through 2040, so in order to capitalise on its favourable demography India must act now. In particular, India must quickly and massively invest in its public education system, with a focus on improving the skills of its burgeoning population through vocational education. India's plan to raise its higher education participation rate to 15% by 2015 is still far below what is necessary, and concerted and long-term planning is required to ensure that India transforms its growing workforce into an inclusive and sustainable economic advantage.

All of this presents major opportunities for a nation like Australia. Provided Canberra can fix the policy and perception problems surrounding the 2009-2010 crises about the treatment of Indian students, Australia has every prospect of becoming a serious partner in helping India realise the benefits of its youthful population.

Photo by Flickr user mckaysavage.

For many years the US had a fantasy of being able to fight two wars simultaneously. This now seems to have been reduced to winning one war and deterring a second while handling a range of smaller military activities.

Strangely, we thought the 'two war' requirement was scuttled many years ago when President Bush in 2001 directed a 'new strategy' that ordered 'the armed forces to "win decisively" in a single major conflict, defend American territory against new threats and, at the same time, conduct a number of holding actions elsewhere around the globe'.

However, I do strongly support the statement at the time that the value of the 'two-war requirement' was less a full-blown strategy than a system for deciding the size of the American armed forces, and as such, a similar statement for force structuring purposes has value. But if your strategy has a 'two wars' requirement, it is a failure of strategy if you then find that you cannot fight two wars, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The so-called refocusing on the Asia Pacific might have some benefit for our region, in that we US allies can continue to under-resource our own security. Of course, this refocusing will only last one millisecond after the next crisis in any part of the world that is not the Asia Pacific. Even the US cannot define where the next crisis will be just by saying it.

There are still many nutters in the world outside the Asia Pacific and they might have a say. The Asia Pacific might pose the most difficult strategic challenge for the US in the long term, but I wonder if it is the most immediate.

In no order of priority, I wonder if some or all of the following are not more likely than an Asia Pacific conflict: a failure of the Arab Spring and its dominance by extreme groups who export terrorism; the failure of Pakistan as a state at the hands of their internal Taliban; the actions of Iran in the Gulf, with its ability directly or through its proxies to impact on Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Israel, oil, and some Gulf Nations; and/or an interaction of Iran and Israel and the bomb.

We might learn more of what the US intends strategically and how connected it is to reality as Washington announces its budget in the next few weeks. It might be wise to be sceptical and never believe what politicians say, especially if they are talking strategy. Only believe what they do.

Photo courtesy of the US Department of Defense.

DFAT remains underfunded for the diplomatic and economic challenges ahead. The Defence Department's Force 2030 White Paper (2009) continues to be debated and until Rudd's NSS in 2008, the Defence white papers were de facto national security policy. With the exception of the 1986 Dibb Review and the 1987 statement, the Defence white papers have not fully addressed grand strategy conceptualisation. Both departments pursue their respective interests and instruments of power at the expense of a coordinated grand strategy, and at the risk of institutional capture. In contrast to the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms, Gillard's current (in)actions on the NSS, NSA role and annual national security budget suggests a different conclusion: strategy drift.

Peter Layton:

Andrew has nicely observed that the immediate bureaucracy that serves a Prime Minister needs to be shaped according to that PM's management style to be both effective and used. While embedded in a very different governmental system, the history of the National Security Advisor position across successive American presidential administrations also bears this out. (May I suggest David Rothkopf's 'Running the World' as a good read on this.) Andrew notes approvingly that a return to decentralization appears underway. This may be a good thing but it comes at some costs, even if these may not be readily apparent.

The main issue is that the major lesson learned by some in the first decade of this century — and in parts of the last — was that national security was best conducted as a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation affair. Decentralization of policy making and a return to leaving such matters to just a couple of the big departments risks losing this.

With the best will in the world the big departments left to themselves will treat their individual needs as their first priority, especially in times of austerity. In such an environment, departmental insularity and a fixation on preserving the status quo may well prevail. The national security policy at the highest level may then simply be the sum of the various department's desires.

This may not be a bad thing. If the government has a declining interest in national security then specialization and retention of expertise at the departmental level may be appropriate, keeping things going until some future time needs a national approach. Moreover, the sum of many different departmental desires may have within them something that is useful to a future government in the future that eventuates. If that sounds like leaving national security matters to serendipity it is, but such a reliance on simply reacting to events as needs be with whatever is available has some benefits in an uncertain world. It is also not uncommon. Lord Salisbury in 1877 near the high point of the British Empire observed that 'English policy is to float lazily downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions'.

Salisbury's quote though also raises questions about unthinkingly or unknowingly embracing through decentralization such an event-driven, reactive approach as a national security policy — whose stream, taking the nation where and how fast? There is much, much more to all this as there are many implications and ramifications, but too much space has already been taken. Choosing a centralized or decentralized approach to national security policy making should be carefully thought about before rushing back to the decentralized recent past.

When discussions about the political situation arose, many young people expressed support for the present regime – consistent with results in the Lowy Institute's recent Fiji Poll. They stated that Prime Minister Bainimarama was implementing reforms to fight corruption, developing a People's Charter and improving the voting system. They also said that Bainimarama believed young people's minds should be promoted and developed. They appeared confident that they would be able to vote for the first time in the elections scheduled for 2014.

However, young people's immediate environments appeared to be dominated by institutions based on autocratic forms of organisation and decision-making. As they discussed their lives, it became apparent that only a minority had equal input into decisions made by parents about their future. None described dedicated avenues to voice youth needs and opinions in village meetings or religious-based youth groups, and all final decisions were made by elders or leaders.

Other research has noted that the Fijian school curriculum lacks a coherent stream of education in subjects such as citizenship, democracy and civic society. When this is combined with the dominance of autocratic institutions in young people's environments, there are few, if any opportunities available for them to learn about democratic values and processes.

By analysing trends across the globe, US political demographer Richard Cincotta suggests that countries showing a 'youth bulge' are at high risk of political instability. Although a range of factors can affect the course of events, when much of a country's population is young, authoritarian regimes have shown a greater capacity to mobilise and recruit youth (particularly unemployed males) with resulting fractious politics.

Cincotta notes, however, that in some instances, states have actually been able to make democratic gains in response to pressure from youth-led democracy movements. As the population profile reaches a more mature age structure, a country is more likely to attain a stable liberal democracy.

Given limited internal sources of mentoring and support for democratic values and processes, external resources must be provided, and the most logical providers are nearby countries with the experience and interest to do so. Australia, with its strong economic ties to Fiji, is very well placed to provide this assistance. Since the 2006 coup however, relations between the countries have deteriorated to the extent any regular high-level bilateral communication have virtually ceased.

Although there are no guarantees about whether elections scheduled to occur Fiji in 2014 will take place, time is running out.  The longer the political instability continues, the further the economic situation will decline and the greater the hardships faced by community members.

Photo by Flickr user infiniteview.

• PNG's love-hate relationship with its resource wealth took a turn for the worse as disgruntled landowners occupied major mining projects around the country, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of 1084 landowners for a permanent injunction against the Chinese MCC's plan to dump tailings from Ramu Nickel mine into Basamuk Bay. In a 2-1 decision, the dissenting judge found a reasonable likelihood of environmental catastrophe, while her colleagues found that constitutional directives against environmental damage were non-justiciable. After years of delay, Ramu — China's largest greenfield mining investment abroad — will soon begin production and will be operating at peak capacity by mid-2013. Keep an eye out for the Lowy Institute's research on China's controversial flagship investment in the Pacific, out early this year.
• Not helped by the Ramu decision, uncertainty continues to linger around the roles of the courts, Parliament, Governor-General and the very confusing constitution of PNG. In a nutshell, December saw the Supreme Court throw out a government, only for that government to subsequently pass retrospective legislation that rendered irrelevant the Supreme Court's decision. In response, the Governor-General professed confusion over the legalities of the crisis, before declaring Somare the rightful PM, only to be fired and replaced by Parliament, only then to be re-instated after confessing error and declaring O'Neill PM after all.

2012 was always going to a big year for PNG, with elections due in June/July and the spoils of Exxon-Mobil's US$15 billion LNG project at stake. An internationally-publicised wrangle between the country's most prominent public figure and a near-unknown has only upped the ante, so expect PNG's always-vibrant electoral competition to be extraordinarily fierce this year. Keep abreast of developments by following this blog, along with the #PNG hashtag on twitter and other social media, the unlikely but nevertheless best source of news from the land of the unexpected.

Photo by Flickr user j3tdillo of the mural adorning PNG's parliament.

I accept Michael Angwin's challenge to inject truth into the debate about the horrific damage done to the human body by ionising radiation. Deniers of this have a long history, having covered up damage about the Trinity atomic bomb test at Alamagordo in July 1945, and then attempting to do so, initially at least, about Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Bikini, and then over a longer period about Calder Hall, Kyshtym, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

They are still at it, particularly about long-term damaging effects of numerous radiation leaks and accidents in the international nuclear industry. They are again gathering their forces to deny or airbrush mortality and morbidity rates at Fukushima. After visiting Tohoku and talking to many people within the exclusion zone in October, I have committed my findings to a book on Fukushima to be published in 2012. Perhaps Michael Angwin may learn something from this. It is certainly about the truth.

Pang: You know, China joined the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s, and then China was in its early years of reform and opening and very much needed assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. And later on China wanted to find global markets, so China joined the rules-based WTO. But you know this era is over and China is now talking about how to protect China's increasing global interests. And some people in China say, we need a modernised PLA to protect its interests, and China should have a smart navy, to protect it interests. But China's international institutions say China should continue to stress a multilateral system. But the multilateral system is now facing a crisis of effectiveness because of so many bilateral relationships.

China's global interests continue to increase. But you have to face the so-called security dilemma — if China strengthens its navy, the US and so many others will respond negatively. So in my view China should go to multilateral bodies to seek solutions to protect and to increase its interests.

Pete and David: How is China's increasing power affecting its attitude to non-interference in international organisations?

Pang: There has been legal evolution, and it is a complicated issue. In 1950s, China intervened in the Korean War, and China was standing with North Korea, but at the same time, China, India, and Indonesia helped to develop the common rule of developing countries, of non-interference. At that time, it served two purposes: one is to have a common rule, common norm, to resist the interference and interventions imposed by the West and the Soviet Union, and the other was to consolidate their newly-obtained sovereignty. In 1960s, China received intervention from the Soviet Union, and also China faced strategic pressure from the US, so conflict happened between China and the Soviet Union, and China was so isolated, but at the same time Mao Zedong exported revolution to African countries and Asian countries. So this is Chinese history — so many conflicting messages in the 1960s.

In the 1970s, China allied with the US against the Soviet Union, and China supported the international opposition against Soviet Union's invasion into Afghanistan. China and Vietnam had a military conflict in 1979, China opened up formally in 1979, and China finished isolation, and also began to explore the new direction of foreign policy. In the 1980s, it seems China just pursued the so-called 'independent foreign policy for peace.' And China had no interest in supporting the African liberation or independence movements, no interest in consolidating its relationship with North Korea, and China reduced foreign aid to poor countries.

So if you take a historical perspective, strictly China only carried out its non-interference foreign policy in the 1990s, when it had the 'laying-low and biding your time' policy. That was when the US was declaring the end of history — politically, China had to take a low-key foreign policy.

In my view China should declare clearly that China intervenes globally, regionally, and multilaterally, but conditionally. But Chinese interventions should be strictly regarded as Chinese contributions to international stability and peace. They should be contributions to international missions, authorised by the UN and by regional organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

So the big question for the West, and others, is this: yesterday you criticised China for non-interference, and China was not so active in dealing with countries in Africa, using the non-interference as an excuse. But if tomorrow China intervenes, how will the world respond to an interventionist China?

A global China, you know, has to intervene. The question is how to use the Chinese power, how China can intervene effectively and legitimately. So Chinese intervention is a new kind of international intervention. And I do believe China now lacks enough paradigms to conduct such a Chinese approach. China must not intervene in the name of protecting Chinese interests — some American interventions are seen as protecting American interests, and the world takes them as a challenge. From the beginning, China should intervene multilaterally as a part of international interventions like peacekeeping. China should collaborate with regional organisations, with the African Union, even with NATO if invited.

When the Interpreter returns in January we will post Pang's analysis of China's role in international institutions. Photo by Flickr user FriendsofEurope.

Second, I was clear that unauthorised boat arrivals do matter, and must be addressed, but not for the reason most usually cited, which is rising numbers (and they have been rising quickly towards the end of the year). I felt that a much more pressing reason to stop the boats was the humanitarian impulse to prevent tragedies such as this weekend's, but more generally to provide a safer and more dignified way for desperate people to find sanctuary.

I suggested that shifting the focus from numbers to humanitarianism might reduce the scope for politicking over this issue, and perhaps pave the way for a concerted effort to find a solution. The other reason I felt it was important to find a solution was because a relatively small problem has begun, in my opinion, to do lasting damage to the political and policy arena.

It has driven a wedge between the main political parties, strained relations between the executive and judiciary, poisoned the relationship between government and civil society, and threatens to reduce public confidence in the Government's ability to manage migration and control borders. In such a toxic environment, it will become difficult for the Government to enact any innovative policies on boats, asylum and refugees, and migration more generally.

Third, I said that I felt it was a mistake to pin too many hopes on the so-called Malaysia deal. Provocatively, I described the proposal as a 'Hail Mary' rather than evidence-based policy making. By which I meant that I know of no comparable policy ever enacted anywhere else in the world, and thus there is no evidence that the policy would actually work.

It might, but it might not, and that seemed to me to be an unnecessarily high-risk strategy, particularly as it was inevitable that the proposal would do just the sort of damage to the political and policy arena I described above, as well as raise eyebrows among the global humanitarian and human rights community. Specifically, I felt that the policy was based on two assumptions that current research evidence is at best ambiguous on, namely that it would deter both migrant smugglers and potential asylum seekers.

I concluded my talk by laying out ten policies that I felt would be more effective in the long-term than the Malaysia deal, and together would represent a comprehensive approach, based on tried and tested policies, and that respect both Australia's commitment to international law and the human rights of those concerned.

Probably the most controversial point I made in this context was that in my opinion the Government should consider all possible policy options, including if necessary a return to Nauru. It is hard to argue with the evidence that the so-called Pacific Solution coincided with a significant reduction in unauthorised boat arrivals, and that since it was lifted numbers have risen significantly, although it is also important to acknowledge the damage that the policy did to Australia's international reputation. And even if the policy worked once does not necessarily mean it would work again. Nevertheless, to discount policies simply because of their political label seemed to me be irresponsible.

I may have also ruffled some feathers by saying that I felt that a regional processing centre was a good policy to pursue, that a review of the current asylum appeals system would be legitimate, that I was surprised that the Government has not found the political will or technical capacity to reduce the number of people for whom applications or appeals are pending, that the Government would need to tackle head on the difficult policy decisions around deportation, and that, for the longer-term, development aid might be targeted on those countries that are the main sources of unauthorised boat arrivals. I was also clear that the Government should consult as widely as possible in developing a comprehensive approach.

I am not an Australian citizen, and I have no affiliation whatsoever with any political party in Australia. My intention at Lowy was deliberately to provide an outside perspective, to try to help place the Australian challenge in a global context, and to consider to what extent policies that have been adopted elsewhere might work in Australia. I don't mind who wins the next election in Australia, but I do mind that people are drowning in search of sanctuary.

Photo by Flickr user isawasi.

Beijing is interested in using international exercises for the political purposes of building confidence with nations in the region, cooperating with international partners in mitigating non-traditional security challenges, and counterbalancing what it perceives as Washington's hegemony. There are also professional benefits for the PLA: international exercises enhance modernisation efforts and capabilities in military operations other than war. 

The strengthening of US-Australia defence relations marked by the November Obama visit was interpreted by Beijing as a consolidation of a perceived American containment strategy. From a Chinese point of view, therefore, Cooperation Spirit 2011 might have served as a way to build confidence with Australia and thus – however slightly – offset Washington's enlistment of Canberra in an assertive regional strategy.

Of course, exercises like this are usually planned months in advance, so the decision in Beijing would not have been to hold the exercise so much as not to cancel it.

By engaging in a cooperative disaster relief activity, China sells itself to the Australian Government and public as a benign partner rather than a threat. It is also an attempt to prove that Beijing is able to bolster political and defence relations with a key US ally, eroding any presumptions that the Washington-Canberra alliance is watertight.

The exercise is also underpinned by the PLA's desire to enhance its non-warlike capabilities. Disaster relief and other humanitarian missions are expanding roles for the PLA. The Sichuan earthquake in 2008 exposed deficiencies in the military's ability to respond to both domestic and international disasters. By engaging in bilateral disaster relief exercises, the PLA hopes to accrue practices and doctrines from more experienced partners as well as to gain experience in coordinating with foreign militaries in rescue operations. Attaining the skills to employ its military resources for humanitarian purposes strengthens Beijing's ability to exert soft power abroad and enhances the PLA's public image at home.

This latest Sino-Australian military exercise underlines the multiple gains Beijing seeks from such activities: improving a diplomatic relationship while also diversifying and modernising its military capabilities. Understanding what China seeks to gain from these exercises can help Australian policy-makers determine how to proceed with defence ties with Beijing in an era where the US has declared itself in Asia to stay.

 Image courtesy of the Defence Department.

The application of nuclear science and technology to our world has probably never been so diverse or expansive, from the simple smoke detector outside our bedroom to the search for the origins of the universe with the Large Hadron Collider. Likewise, the breadth of who is an expert in facets of nuclear has similarly expanded and diversified — diplomats, scientists, physicians, scholars, engineers, tradespeople, IT professionals, academics, miners, mathematicians, manufacturers...even some archaeologists I know employing carbon dating, now logically claim a type of expertise and opinion. This rich diversity is why I found Richard Broinowski's riposte so perplexing.

Does someone really have to be of a particular bias or occupation to bring intellectual rigour, expertise or simply a thought-provoking perspective to a 'Lecture series' or a blog debate? With the breadth of nuclear science & technology applications I alluded to earlier, is there clear articulation of who/what constitutes a 'pro-nuke'? Should we dismiss the contribution of a 'pro-nuke' (medicines) expert in favour of that of an 'anti-nuke' (weapons) expert or are we able to see the grey, namely that both these perspectives could exist in one person and thus contribute to a lecture or debate on nuclear?

Michael Angwin, CEO of the Australian Uranium Association, writes:

Richard Broinowski is quite right to argue for the place of emotion in the nuclear debate. I defend that because I am often outraged by some of the things I see and hear and my emotions come to the surface too. And I’d inject more emotion into my advocacy except that I’m certain to be taken to task by Broinowski and others if I did. But he's still right: it is entirely appropriate to inject some emotion without being irrational.

Broinowski's problem — contrary to his own standard — is the rationality bit. Here's an example, taken from his Four Corners interview in April this year, talking about the crews helping to stabilise the Fukushima plant: 'They're going to die, many of them I think are probably sacrificing their lives'. There's no doubt about the emotion. But it's not rational. It's made up. That kind of remark is in the same category as one by, for example, Guy Rundle writing in Crikey in March, of the helicopter crews doing water drops over Fukushima: 'The Japanese crews will slough their skin and muscles, and bleed out internally under the glare of the world's media'.

Or those claiming Australians are 'morally culpable' for Fukushima because Australian uranium was used at the plant. Or those who make unsubstantiated and unscientific claims about fatalities caused by Chernobyl. Or those who circulate sad photos of children with deformities and claim this is what will happen to children conceived in the vicinity of uranium mines. Or who claim the IAEA and the World Health Organisation have a secret covenant under which the WHO goes easy on the impact of nuclear power on public health. I could go on. The challenge for Broinowski and others is not so much to inject some rationality into their claims as to inject some truth.

And on 1 December, you had a panel discussion with Scott Sagan of Stanford, John Carlson (again) and Martine Letts arguing about whether we could have nuclear power without proliferation. The conclusion was, of course, that we could, and that exporting uranium to India was a good thing. Not to be outdone, Rory Medcalf managed to insult both the left-wing of the ALP and Bollywood when he asserted that Stephen Conroy's performance at the ALP national conference would have been a rich source for a Bollywood blockbuster.

The fact is that you can't have an objective debate while leaving out people who oppose nuclear power on various economic, health and environmental grounds, such as Dr Mark Diesendorf of UNSW, prominent radiation physicians Dr Tilman Ruff and Dr Peter Karamaskos, or Dr Sue Wareham of the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW). By all means have the miners who see Fukushima as a roadblock to profits, but don't delude yourselves into thinking it is some kind of objective debate.

I would also take issue with your view that the future of nuclear power is best debated without emotion. Those who push your nuclear agenda frequently advocate an 'unemotional' or 'objective' debate on nuclear matters, the sub-text being that anti-nukes are perforce emotional and irrational, but we pro-nukes are not. But as the technology is Janus-faced, both immensely destructive and polluting as well as being a sophisticated way to boil water, it is entirely appropriate to inject some emotion without being irrational.