The Korean peninsula is an area, or issue, with which both China and the US are deeply engaged. It's hard to be optimistic about outcomes from the Six-Party Talks framework, given the difficulty of the issue and North Korea's unpredictability, but it's also hard to maintain that the US needs to change its method of handling the issue in order to align with China more closely.

The Taiwan issue is perhaps one area on which the US might with advantage consider changing its attitude. The current arms sale row seems something of an anachronism, given the improved relations between Beijing and Taipei and the ever-increasing integration of their economies. 

There's a treatment of this question in the Jan/Feb 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, in which Bruce Gilley contends (subscription required) that the US should support, not oppose, the 'Finlandization' of Taiwan, in the interests of promoting 'long-term peace through closer economic, social and political ties between Taiwan and China'. Such a change would not be easy; the US 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides for continuing arms sales to Taiwan. But if it occurred it would certainly have further consequences for US strategy in the region.

It would be interesting to know whether a change of policy on Taiwan figures in White's view of what the US should do to adapt to the new situation and, whether it does or not, what is the set of policies he would like the US to adopt.

Photo by Flickr user imovermyhead, used under a Creative Commons license.

With this right to know comes a responsibility to be informed. To make defence transparency effective the Australian public needs to understand that when the Australian Army talks about cavalry, it doesn't mean horses. And it helps to have read about an Australian military campaign more recent than Gallipoli.

Outside of the commentary of a handful of experts, the current public defence debate often seems as informed as a discussion on health policy framed by watching a few episodes of House. Or a consideration of NSW state politics predicated on a few seasons of The Sopranos. Actually, scratch that last example.

The Sydney Morning Herald's drive for greater Defence accountability should be applauded. So too should be former Army Chief Lieutenant-General Peter Leahy for his willingness to engage in an intelligent discussion about funding priorities — as well as his willingness  to quote the work of the Lowy Institute.

Greater transparency in Defence spending is a good thing. It will help make the Department leaner and focus spending where it is needed most. Let's hope the Australian public welcomes it with informed criticism, rather than cheap shots at a Defence force which it doesn't fully understand.

Photo by Flickr user mdezemery, used under a Creative Commons license.

As I sat with his father and his sister, the local mayor and the state and federal members watching the match, with Matt's son, his brother, and a number of Matt's SAS mates among the spectators, I spent a few minutes thinking about the emotional side of conflict, about honour, bravery, mateship, success, failure. Perhaps we can justify some things that we were all involved in by the fact that Iraq voted again.

Now the hard work begins; forming a government and continuing to embed the institutions of Iraqi democracy as US forces leave. In a grossly imperfect world, this is still an extraordinary achievement by Iraq, the US and many others. Millions of people like Matt Locke in Iraq and in Afghanistan, through their often invisible contributions, have remedied our collective errors and made this possible. Let's not over-analyse it, at least for a few days, and just consider what an amazing achievement this is.

Photo by Flickr user brownbearphotography, used under a Creative Commons license.

While the Antarctic Treaty System precludes military activity on the continent, it is worth contrasting the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) approach to Antarctica with that of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). The NZDF regularly flies Air Force planes to Antarctica and has between 20 and 60 military personnel there to assist with logistics, support search and rescue efforts and maintain links with the US Antarctic Program. The NZDF has also conducted trials staging its P-3K Orion aircraft from Antarctica to support Southern Ocean surveillance in support of the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

The ADF has no recent experience operating in Antarctica, thinking strategically about Antarctic security, or planning for contingencies in Australian Antarctic Territory. The running conflict between Japanese whaling ships and Sea Shepherd vessels in the Southern Ocean has sparked calls for Australian warships to be dispatched south and probably spurred hasty thinking about how to enforce Australian and international law in Australian Antarctic waters. Beyond that, the only military appreciation of Antarctica by the ADF seems to be found in an 1993 ADF Journal article that calls for military cooperation with the Australian Antarctic Division.

The likelihood of strategic abrasion in Antarctica is rising. The Antarctic Treaty System, which has done an excellent job thus far of preserving Antarctica for peaceful purposes, has been tested recently by friction between states regarding maritime territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. While the 1991 Madrid Protocol bans mining in Antarctica until 2048, issues surrounding mineral exploration and extraction are likely to emerge again should global prices rise to levels where extraction from Antarctica would be commercially feasible.

Australia's 1987 Defence White Paper said Australia's national interest was to see a demilitarised Antarctica free from political and strategic competition. There has been little mention of Antarctic policy in Defence white papers since. Over twenty years later, major powers like China and India continue to enthusiastically expand their Antarctic operations. The recent increased militarisation of the Arctic by Canada and Russia forewarns similar strategic tension that could emerge in Antarctica should the fragile peace of the Antarctic Treaty System be disrupted.

Australian strategic planners would do well to not be caught napping.

 Photo by Flickr user Martha de Jong-Lantink, used under a Creative Commons license.

The Indian project is small compared to a Chinese project in Myanmar that began about three years back. But, aiming to match China's clout, India has met some of Myanmar's defence needs and assisted development projects.

The second project is the access to Bangladesh's Chittagong port, which will involve resuming a pre-partition road and rail link from Northeastern state of Tripura to the port city. Chittagong has one of the finest deep sea ports in South Asia. This project was agreed during Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's India visit this January.

India's contribution to the Kaladan project is US$100 million and is proposed to be completed in four years. The bidding process began in February. Although Chittagong is a better port than Sittwe and connectivity would be faster, New Delhi will continue with the Sittwe-Mizoram link. This is to take care of any possible change in government in Dhaka that may deny access to Chittagong port.

Providing a corridor to India has been a politically sensitive issue in Bangladesh. However, after Hasina returned to power in December 2008, she decided to connect Bangladesh to the rest of the world.

Hugh says:

Knowing Jim as an old friend and valued colleague, I suspect he will be inclined to reply that, having committed ourselves to a job, we should do whatever it takes to finish it. In an operational or tactical commander, this kind of single-minded pursuit of an assigned mission is highly admirable. For a strategic-level decision maker, it is an abrogation of the responsibility to ensure that the ends justify the means.

I am sure it was Hugh's clumsy phrasing that leads him to imply that, with an operational or tactical background, I am not up to strategic-level decision making. No modern military worth its salt has, since about 1914, held up the 'single minded pursuit of an assigned mission' as a dominant quality in operational or tactical level actions.

This ignorance of the tactical tools of strategy is one reason why strategy in Australia since the 70s has been dislocated from operational and tactical means and has therefore displaced itself from reality. Go no further than every White Paper on defence since the end of Vietnam, that never created the means of achieving their own strategic ends.

You cannot separate tactical and operational issues from strategy – ends and means must be aligned all the way up and down. The only reason Australia's strategy has not been shown to be a failure is that it has not been tested – a very lucky country indeed.

Photo by Flickr user Kinky Fantastic, used under a Creative Commons license.

He also said the PNTL wasn't learning anything from its UN counterparts. After all, the commander asked, isn't the UN technically responsible for security? It was a daring rebuke to the logic of the UN's district-by-district handover. Newspapers quickly filled with calls for the return of the PNTL, seen as faster to respond and less hesitant to bring out its guns. PNTL has since returned to the streets, but the incident hurt the image of the UN police and further weakened the 'democratic policing principles' they are here to promote.

Neither the PNTL senior command nor the Government publicly spoke out against the district commander's move. The General Commander was busy leading a dubious 'mega-operation' against rumoured 'ninja' activity in the border districts — without any UN involvement, even though the international force retains executive authority in the area. (One leading NGO has also raised concerns over possible human rights violations.)

The Secretary-General's report is short on prescriptions to cure the ills of the Timorese police, but provides incisive diagnosis of its problems. Dili is back to 'apparent normalcy' since the 2006 crisis, but it argues the PNTL is not ready to give up UN support. The service remains weak in operational, administrative and management capacity, and lacks basic equipment. There are few clear, enforced policies on fundamentals such as the use of force. There is ample evidence of misconduct with no effective disciplinary mechanism. Police frequently have little understanding of the country's evolving criminal legislation.

Much work thus remains to be done, but the report also acknowledges the 'limited capacity of UNMIT police to contribute to the development of the PNTL', noting consistent difficulties in attracting staff with the right skills. The Secretary-General recommends a limited reduction in police presence by mid-2011. But the question is not how many police will be here but what they will be doing. Much remains to be defined regarding a 'reconfiguration' of roles as the handover proceeds.

Given this inability of UN police to influence outcomes, Crisis Group recommended in December that the UN hand over formal control sooner rather than later. This would bring the mission's mandate into line with the reality of policing in the country and hopefully prompt the Government, and the police, to take further steps toward solving problems only they can fix.

Future support from either the UN, Australia, Portugal, or even Indonesia will only work if the Government can be clear about its needs. It requires a comprehensive plan for the force's future development — a full independent assessment could be a first step. In the meantime, the Government, PNTL and UNMIT need to put aside public rancour and find common ground on 'reconfiguring' the role of the UN police if they are to remain an active player rather than a mere spectator in building the police in Timor-Leste.

Photo by Flickr user United Nations Photo, used under a Creative Commons license.

Global aid spending is no better. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee reported that in 2008, total aid spending by all rich OECD countries combined amounted to around $120 billion. This works out to around $30 per person when spread across the (roughly) 4 billion people in the poor countries which receive the aid – or around $2 per person per month. 

You don't get much for $2 per person per month, especially when you are trying to respond to a list of demands which includes disasters (Haiti), hunger, malnutrition, disease (tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, malaria), agricultural development, primary, secondary and tertiary education, water supply, sanitation, roads, electricity, ports, family planning, domestic violence, gender issues, corruption, democracy, elections, rule of law, drugs, money laundering and climate change, among others.

Photo by Flickr user Eifion, used under a Creative Commons license.

In situations amenable to non-intervention, military or otherwise, I support non-intervention. In situations where NGOs alone can achieve results, I strongly support their use. In situations where NGOs plus local lightly armed police or gendarmerie can achieve results, then use them. In situations where external forces are appropriate, then get it right and use them as part of an adequate package.

There are two 'near-constants'. The first is that the non-military people who make decisions about the use of military and non-military elements will almost always under-commit in the first instance. There are few exceptions; Colin Powell's successes in 1991 and in the use of massive force in Panama City come to mind. We could all wonder what might have been if Powell and not Rumsfeld had been the Secretary of Defense in 2003.

The second constant is that everyone will talk about the importance of the non-military element in all of this (under the name of interagency or cross-government or whatever), and it rarely happens. Powell could not get his diplomats and aid people out of their 'nice' capitals.

There are consequences of these 'near-constants' in situations that require the use of military force to establish security before non-military elements can be effective. First, the military is permitted insufficient initial capacity to establish security, as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. This means the non-military decision-makers then need to commit more forces because they did not allocate the right level to begin with (perhaps this is where Sam's 'more' might come from). Secondly, the non-military elements do not materialise so we revert to (guess what) 'more' military.

Photo by Flickr user US Army Korea - IMCOM, used under a Creative Commons license.

...instead of viewing Copenhagen as the be-all-and-end-all for global climate policy, we should reconceptualise the significance of the conference in the following terms: as one line in an ongoing conversation between governments, markets and ordinary citizens; a conversation that should generate an intensification of concrete actions by each of these groups to reduce emissions.

I use the term 'conversation' as a metaphor for the interaction between the different types of actors I referred to in the quote. I am not suggesting that having a literal conversation among states should be a substitute for international negotiations that produce tangible results. I do, however, think that there is a tendency to overemphasise the importance of comprehensive international negotiations leading to the sort of 'major outcome' that many desire, and that this tends to come at the expense of focusing on domestic institutions, actors and processes, where most of the real power to implement change actually lies.

The poor domestic implementation of the Kyoto Protocol highlights this problem. Governments spent many years negotiating Kyoto, and when it was finally agreed it was indeed a 'major outcome'. Yet as a model for international cooperation on climate change, Kyoto is flawed because it is premised on the assumption that the climate can be managed in a top-down manner through targets and timetables while ignoring the challenges associated with climate policy implementation — which necessarily involves structural economic change at the domestic level. Unfortunately, most governments seem intent on replicating – in fact, magnifying – those flaws in the negotiation of a post-Kyoto international treaty.

The Kyoto experience reminds us that without domestic implementation, treaties are just words on a page. Sure, those words can be helpful in spurring action by governments, but it is only the latter that possess the power and legitimacy to respond adequately to climate change. In my view, therefore, much more intense interaction needs to occur among international institutions (ie. governments acting collectively), individual governments, the business community and citizens if we are going to achieve anything near success in prosecuting that response. That's what I mean when I say the climate conversation needs to improve.

Photo by Flickr user Susan NYC, used under a Creative Commons license.

Commitment to the non-binding Accord was tested for the first time at the end of January, by which time countries were invited to indicate whether they were associating themselves with the Accord. Developed countries were also invited to indicate their 2020 emissions reduction targets and developing countries their 'mitigation actions'. 

As of 8 February, some 94 countries (including the 27 member states of the EU) have associated themselves with the Accord and 64 countries have submitted targets or actions, including all major emitters. In one sense, this reflects a degree of progress: all domestic commitments have been compiled in one place for the first time.

But in another sense, the exercise turned out to be a hollow formality, as everyone just promised to do what they had already promised to do at or before Copenhagen. Major developed countries have simply restated their existing conditional targets (or target ranges) and the major emitting developing countries have submitted the 'actions' to which they were already committed (official submissions are available here; see this list for a useful summary). 

The so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have also stressed that their mitigation actions are 'voluntary', not internationally binding. 

There's clearly widespread political commitment to the Accord, but so far all it has done is shine a brighter light onto the status quo – and, in so doing, illuminated the many disputes and inadequacies that bedevil mitigation ambitions.

Disappointingly, there has been little indication of where the international process might go from here. Countries will inevitably continue negotiations towards a comprehensive set of international agreements in the lumbering UNFCCC process, but with no end in sight. There's some half-hearted chatter about the potential for a treaty at the next Conference of the Parties in Mexico later this year, but that seems optimistic in the light of Copenhagen. Countries have yet to even agree a work program of pre-Mexico meetings for the rest of this year.

The possibility of advancing international climate policy in other fora (eg. the G20, the Major Economies Forum, and entirely new institutions focused on smaller pieces of the mitigation puzzle) is a much more exciting one, as Greg Picker and I argued after Copenhagen. Officials from the main countries have reportedly been holding discussions behind the scenes in which such alternative processes have been discussed, but it seems countries are a long way from figuring out exactly what these might entail and how (if at all) they would relate to the Accord and to the UN process.

Maybe there will be some forthcoming announcements charting a bold new direction for international climate change negotiations. As it stands, however, the 'conversation' at the inter-governmental level appears subdued and directionless.

Photo by Flickr user fernando zarur, used under a Creative Commons license.

Spectacular attacks in Kabul linked to rapid media statements are an old trick for the Taliban. They've refined their methods based on media results from similar attacks on Kabul government buildings in February 2009 and an earlier Victory Day attack on President Karzai in April 2008. While the attacks make for headlines around the world that bemoan the lack of security in Afghanistan, they don't really change the broader security situation in Afghanistan much at all.

What the Taliban's spectacular attack strategy does do is create events tailor made for media. This strategy is integral to creating the perception that the Taliban is winning in Afghanistan.

The reality is that there are several good reasons for why perception of momentum should rest with the Afghan and Western security forces: the US has committed to raise troop levels by nearly 30%, the war is finally being resourced on an appropriate level, and an increasing commitment of civilian and aid resources is matching the military increase in tempo.

But the US and ISAF have had little success in spinning their story. General McCrystal's own initial assessment report to the US Secretary of Defence outlines some of the inadequacies in the ISAF strategic communications effort that he labels 'ill-equipped and under-resourced'.

The ramifications of losing the battle for perception are much more serious now that the Afghan Government and the international community have decided to enthusiastically pursue a program of reconciliation and reintegration with the Taliban. CSIS analyst Anthony Cordesmann notes in this podcast from July 2009 that attempted reconciliation with Taliban elements will be dangerous if public perception is that the Taliban are wining. Reconciliation in that light, he believes, will only offer insurgents valuable time to regroup or an opportunity to exploit Afghan Government weakness.

In May 2009 Zabihullah Mujahid granted a rare TV interview to CNN's Nic Robertson. Mujahid had his back to the camera but his hands gave away what kind of man runs the Taliban's war of spin. They were not the hands of a hardened hill fighter the likes of which Australian forces regularly encounter in Uruzgan.

Instead they were the smooth, well-kept hands of a professional – most likely fluent in several languages, eloquent, and well connected within media and political circles in the Af-Pak region. In a climate in which the Afghan Government is talking reconciliation, it remains to be seen how long it will be until Zabihullah Mujahid turns his face to the camera. Victory in the battle for perceptions might just be the re-creation of the Taliban as a legitimate political force, with Zabihullah Mujahid as its legitimate chief spokesman.

Photo by Flickr user elycefeliz, used under a Creative Commons license.

There is no real gain in this kind of narrow emotional exchange because we have not addressed the real issue of what people call 'The Iraq War'. To have pulled out of the war after the invasion would have compounded the errors of starting it – yet so many people were incapable of assessing the counterinsurgency separately from the invasion. This caused immense problems in then waging the counterinsurgency.

To have expected perfection in the first year of the war (when so many chances of an early termination were missed by statesmen because once again they refused to commit adequate resources in a coherent strategy) would be to expect something of this war that has never evidenced itself in any other war – no war goes well to begin with. 

And what almost everyone misses is that, if more countries had supported the US and UK in their efforts at containment for the full period, the war may not have occurred. As Michael Walzer points out in a foreword to a new edition of his classic 'Just and Unjust Wars':

The states that opposed war on the grounds that containment was working were not themselves making it work…Had there been many states or even just a few more states, enforcing the embargo, insisting on inspections and flying planes over northern and southern Iraq, the unilateral abrogation of the containment system by the US would not have been possible (or at least it would not have been as easy as it was).

Which brings us back to Chris Kenny. Chris argues that our PM should encourage the President to take a 'stronger, less populist path to maintain US influence and power…' Of course, the PM cannot take Obama on, for the same reasons that we all are a bit to blame for the Iraq war — because we did not support containment when it had a chance of success in containing both Iraq and the US.

If PM Rudd encourages President Obama to toughen up when Obama visits in March, the President might just start by asking Australia to put its money where its mouth is, and provide a meaningful contribution to operations in Afghanistan. And then we would hear more moaning from those who moaned about 'The Iraq War'.

Photo by Flickr user Ammar Abd Rabbo, used under a Creative Commons license.

Israel's representative underlined his country's concerns about NPT membership. Evans implored Israel to look forward, not back. A small step forward for Israel would be to articulate concerns in a formal dialogue, something Evans managed last year when he convened a meeting in Cairo attended by representatives from Israel, Iran and the Arab League. In short, NPT membership is not a show-stopper and acceptance of this point would be progress.

Similarly, Evans told the Indian representative to the UN in Geneva that, rather than focusing on the intransigence of others, any movement towards signing the CTBT would be progress.

The French representative underlined her country's freeze on nuclear weapon numbers and the dismantling of its nuclear testing facilities. For Evans, however, progress would see France reconsider its unworkable two-tier approach that advocates for reductions and a halt in testing while not formally committing to total nuclear disarmament.

Evans was making the utterly practical point that introspection by those countries with nuclear weapons is the first step. And no matter how small the resulting step, this is progress. Evans concluded by reminding his audience: it's important not to make the best the enemy of the good when it comes to nuclear disarmament.

For example, Andrew says you need to understand the army culture to understand why armies want tanks and artillery (I thought you would also need to understand the nature of combat). Each part of the RAND study has an element of truth but it is a shame Andrew did not list the fourth relevant culture in Defence force structuring, the civilian defence bureaucrat.

The predominantly civilian bureaucratic culture that I perceived in FDA was just as strange as the three Service cultures that Andrew refers to and has as many generalisations. It was characterised by:

• An assumption that civilian intellect would always triumph over military experience.
• A belief that air and maritime tactics were so simple that anyone could understand them and land tactics so bizarre that they were not even worth addressing.
• An inability to understand that strategy is based on sound tactics and sound tactics is based on ideas, people, equipment and training.
• The belief that the end product of the department is the written word to the minister rather than usable military capability.
• A childlike fascination for simplistic military history leading to a belief that there are simple answers to complex problems.
• And finally, a cavalier attitude to the creation of effective military capability based on the fact that to many members of FDA, it was all just a clever bureaucratic game.

Of course, contestability of advice is required, and it should be both a uniformed and civilian function. But why should we focus only on an FDA style of contestability? To solve Defence's problems, I would look just as closely at strengthening the joint commanders at the expense of the Services, accountability of leadership, or alignment and consistency of strategies, to mention just a few.

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defence.

He called for a new model of development, one less artificially dependent on the métropole. 'You must not be afraid of your neighbours', he said.

France's presence in the Pacific has been constructive and generally stabilising over the last 15 years, owing to France ceasing its nuclear tests and implementing democratic changes in its Pacific entities. Regional leaders have recognised this, welcoming the French entities as 'associate' members of the Pacific Island Forum. 

But there are cracks emerging. French Polynesia has been wracked with instability, largely because pro-French groups refuse to accept the extent of electoral support for the pro-independence leader Oscar Temaru. The entity is almost entirely dependent on France to pay for the artificially high economy created during the testing program. 

New Caledonia has also seen local divisions, with a weakening of pro-France representation in the local Congress by a new, more extreme independence party. France remains committed to funding the handover of important responsibilities and benefits under the 1998 Noumea Accord, but the handover schedule has slipped.

At the same time as he made his comments, Sarkozy announced further statutory reform in French Polynesia, to change electoral processes yet again. It will be important for stability that these changes do not have the same effect as other statutory changes in recent years, that have diluted the weight of votes for the pro-independence forces.

For New Caledonia, where up to three referenda on the future status and transfer of the five final 'sovereign' powers are to take place from 2014 to 2018, Sarkozy affirmed France's 'total loyalty' to all partners of the Accord, whether pro-France or pro-independence. At the same time, he said discussions must begin so that the results of the referenda foreshadowed by the Accord will be approved by a 'very large majority'. 

With the pro-France group currently  in the (recently reduced) majority, this supposes that talks will result in winning over many of those who currently support independence. Sarkozy's explicit ruling out of independence for France's overseas entities raises questions about the claimed impartiality of the French State as a signatory to the Accord.

Sarkozy also foreshadowed changes for Wallis and Futuna, the tiny archipelago which has been administered, unchallenged, under a 1960 statute right up to the present. He said he was prepared, from this year, to examine propositions for modernisation, but again, 'within the framework of the Republic'.

Canberra is comfortable with France's presence as a partner in the region, and will welcome the intentions for the French collectivities to become more engaged economically. But it should be wary of instabilities arising from any roll-back of democracy, such as by new statutes in French Polynesia or partisan implementation of the Noumea Accord processes; and of any consequent negative reactions by regional leaders, not to mention economic consequences for Australia should France resile from its economic commitments.

Photo by Flickr user gunthert, used under a Creative Commons license.

Essentially, two conditions need to be satisfied for local markets to work — demand and supply. Usually, in megadisasters, there is a collapse of demand. Suddenly, huge numbers of people are dramatically poor, having lost both income and assets. This certainly seems to have occurred in Haiti.

But as Sam says, one also needs supply of goods. Is it true in Haiti there would be no supply if demand was stimulated? I don't know. But consider the following: (a) maps of the disaster zone show areas perhaps 5-10 km away that are relatively little affected, and (b) across the border, not far away by land transport, there is a relatively unaffected economy. Both of these areas are potential sources of supply of food, water, clothing, etc. However, goods will not flow from these areas through markets unless somebody buys them.

Sam wonders how effective a cash-based approach might be. But we also need to wonder how effective a Big Government response will be in Haiti. After all, having an aircraft carrier cruising 20 km offshore is good TV material but it may provide little real help to mothers and children who need water rather than helicopters.

Photo by Flickr user United Nations Photo, used under a Creative Commons license.

Activists have long claimed that Burma's generals want to get their hands on some SRBMs. Few reports on this subject have been based on hard evidence, however, and news stories have often failed to distinguish clearly between SRBMs and other kinds of missiles. For example, the regime's reported efforts to buy or manufacture anti-ship, tactical surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles have frequently been confused with its interest in acquiring ballistic weapon systems. 

The picture has been further clouded by unsubstantiated claims that Burma already possesses SRBMs, and possibly even medium-range ballistic missiles. An anonymous Wikipedia entry states that Naypyidaw took delivery of 11 North Korean Hwasong-6 (Scud C-type) SRBMs in 2009. The regime has been accused of paying for such missiles with heroin. One activist website has referred to four 'bases' along the Burma-Thai border where SRBMs have supposedly been deployed. Such reports have been dismissed by serious Burma watchers.

Similarly, when the North Korean cargo ship Kang Nam I was heading to Rangoon last June, it was widely speculated that the vessel was carrying 'missile parts', as well as nuclear components. If this was so, it would probably have been boarded under UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which prohibits North Korean arms exports. After the ship turned back, the Commander of US Pacific forces admitted that no-one knew what cargo it was carrying.

There is no evidence that Burma has acquired any ballistic missiles. Yet the regime does seem interested in doing so, and at one stage may have even begun negotiations with the North Koreans. In 2004, the US State Department revealed that it had made robust representations to the military government to forestall the possible purchase of 'surface-to-surface' missiles from Pyongyang. This was later acknowledged to be a reference to SRBMs. The US undertook to respond 'vigorously and rapidly' to any such sales.

North Korea military expert Joseph Bermudez believes the issue of ballistic missile sales has arisen in all major meetings between the North Koreans and Burmese since bilateral relations warmed in the early 2000s. However, he thinks Naypyidaw is not ready for such weapons yet. It needs to train personnel, form units and build specialised support facilities (including some underground). Bermudez has also suggested that premature acquisition of SRBMs might complicate the purchase of other foreign arms and equipment sought by the regime. 

Another possibility is that Naypyidaw plans to build its own SRBMs, with Pyongyang's help. Senior Burmese officials visiting North Korea have inspected ballistic missile production plants. Some of the sophisticated machine tools and dual-use equipment imported from Europe and Japan in recent years may not be for a secret nuclear weapons program, as often claimed, but for an indigenous SRBM factory. While not very economical, such a scheme would be in keeping with the regime's wish for defence self-sufficiency.

If this is the regime's aim, such a development is likely to be some years away. Still, the question needs to be asked: what could Burma do with such weapons? Given their relatively short range, questionable accuracy and small conventional warhead, SRBMs are of limited military utility. Inevitably, this has prompted speculation that Naypyidaw plans to arm them with chemical or nuclear warheads, either made in Burma or acquired from North Korea.

Even so, SRBMs would be ineffective against a sea-borne threat and they are unlikely to be aimed at China or India, both of which currently support Burma's military regime.

One theory is that Naypyidaw wants a weapon that can pose a threat to Bangkok, to help deter Thailand from allowing the US to launch an invasion of Burma from Thai territory. The US has never contemplated such an invasion and is unlikely ever to do so, but the prospect of military intervention has worried Burma's generals ever since they crushed the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. Even the Thai king has expressed his concerns about Thailand being used by the US in this way.

Other reasons for Naypyidaw's interest in SRBMs probably include the regime's desire for status and prestige, its perceptions of what 'modern' armed forces should have in their weapons inventories, and its wish for Burma to be taken seriously as an international actor.

As with so many aspects of Burma's security, there is very little hard evidence on which to base assessments. And analysis of this problem is complicated, as always, by rumours, unsubstantiated claims, speculative news reports and propaganda. Even so, the chances of Burma one day acquiring or manufacturing SRBMs seem to be greater than those of Naypyidaw producing a nuclear weapon.

That makes another reason to monitor security developments in Burma closely.

Photo by Flickr user W.Grabar, used under a Creative Commons license.

A draft version of the Accord contained an Appendix that listed pledges for the period 2010-12: the EU commits US$10.6 billion, Japan US$11 billion, and the US promises US$3.6 billion. The American pledge works out at a contribution of around US$4 per US citizen per year, while developing countries on average would receive around US$2.50 per person per year (excluding China, which has signalled that it is not looking for money).

These amounts are almost nothing when compared to the needs for investment in better infrastructure in developing countries, or the relevant expenditure in rich countries. As a random example, New South Wales, an Australian state of 7 million people, is planning to invest $63 billion over 4 years in infrastructure. That's $2,250 per person, per year.

Providing very large climate finance through public budgets in developed countries will be difficult. There will always be backlash about sending more taxpayer dollars abroad, and no guarantee that pledged funding will in fact be made available year after year. It would probably be preferable to fill a global climate financing fund using new financing sources, for example a levy on air travel or on international shipping. Very moderate levies could yield several tens of billions of dollars per year. It would create a stable source of funding without bickering over relative contributions. All countries would pay directly or indirectly, but differentiated in line with affluence between countries and within countries: the rich fly more.

Ultimately, however, very large scale financing, in particular for low-carbon energy systems, must come from private markets. This is logical given the scale of the issue: the IEA estimates that global annual energy investment needs under business-as-usual are around US$1,100 billion per year, plus an additional US$500 billion per year under an ambitious mitigation scenario to meet energy demand using clean technologies. Energy emissions and reductions can also be estimated and traded between countries.

Market financing is mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord, but without detail. The resumed climate negotiations leading towards the Mexico conference at the end of 2010 offer the chance to work out more comprehensive market financing mechanisms, which will be necessary to make real climate mitigation action possible in many developing countries. 

If they cannot be agreed under a UN framework, then they could arise under individual countries' domestic schemes. For example, the EU emissions trading scheme as well as the schemes currently in the legislative process in the US and Australia all have provisions for accepting offsets or permits from developing countries, in return for payments to these countries.

If future emissions targets in developed countries are ambitious enough – and they may well be, if the Accord is being taken seriously – then there will be a strong impetus for creating effective mechanisms for financing climate action in developing countries, as part of that commitment. And in that way, the real money just might begin to flow.

Photo by Flickr user World Bank Photo Collection, used under a Creative Commons license.

Much has been said about the failure of Copenhagen and President Obama himself has copped a ton of criticism – undeservedly, in my view. President Obama and his world-class team of energy and climate change officials have done more in the last 10 months than any US administration in the last 20 years to shove the US and the rest of the world towards a lower-carbon future.

From legislating, regulating and investing heavily in clean energy solutions at home, to an unrelenting diplomatic campaign to engage leaders from emerging economies, Obama has invested an extraordinary amount of political capital in his concerted quest to tackle climate change – and all of this despite presiding over an unforgiving electorate that is deeply divided over the science of climate change, to say nothing of the response to it.

Those who stand aghast at how difficult it was to agree to even such a weak political compact in Copenhagen might consider this question: what would have happened in Copenhagen if it weren't for Obama’s leadership? Now that's a scary thought.

Image courtesy of NBC.com.

First, there is a tough and uncompromising statement about the priority given to economic development and poverty eradication in poor countries. This phrase was presumably insisted upon by China and other developing countries. It is perhaps a little surprising that the US was prepared to go along with it. The relevant phrase (para. 2), which does not mince words, emphasises the need to bear in mind that '...social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries...'

The significance of this phrase is that it bluntly asserts the primacy of development and anti-poverty issues on the international development agenda over climate change and environmental issues. Most developing countries would agree with this emphasis while most environmental groups in the rich world would not.

This is not a minor issue. For close on two decades, there has been tendency for more and more items to be listed on the broad international agenda that is regularly discussed in UN, World Bank, regional development bank, and other main multilateral conferences. There are now so many topics listed on what is known as 'the international development agenda' that some observers refer to the arrangement as 'the Christmas tree.' 

Second, it is significant that the same sentence in the Accord (para. 2) goes on to note that '...a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.' In other words, developing countries are not opposed to the idea of strengthening low-emission strategies to promote development. Indeed, they have declared that they are ready to look for ways to adopt low-emission strategies provided there is financial support from rich countries.

The references to finance, therefore, are the third important aspect of the Copenhagen Accord. Again and again the point is made that rich countries that must provide the finance. The Accord notes that (para.3):

We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaption in developing countries.

There is talk of 'financing by developed countries' (para. 4), the need for the 'the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries' (para. 6), and so on.  Clearly, China and other developing countries extracted their pound of flesh from the US as the Copenhagen clock began to run out of time.
 
But when it came to actually specifying figures, the US won the day. The Accord talks (para. 8) of how rich countries will provide 'new and additional resources...approaching US$30 billion for the period 2010-2012' (which appears to suggest that US$10 billion per annum will be available). And it is suggested (para. 8) that rich countries will:

...commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.

These financial promises are so vague and so meagre when measured against the costs that poor countries face in adopting low-emission strategies while simultaneously expanding their energy use that they are virtually meaningless. 

China and other developing countries won on words but the US won on dollars. There will doubtless be different views as to whether this is a good outcome or not. But one thing is clear. Unless the rich world can come up with firm and honest pledges of vastly increased amounts of funding, the chances that poor countries will move towards the adoption of low-emission growth strategies in the foreseeable future are virtually zero.

Photo by Flickr user UN Climate Change, used under a Creative Commons license.

Our contribution is token because it does not have the number or type of troops to materially contribute to Obama's oft repeated (and still confusing) 'disrupt, dismantle and defeat' ambition or to the tactical mantra of 'shape, clear, hold and build'. This is not to disparage the troops themselves, whose tactical success is almost the only redeeming feature of our contribution.

Australia is also deficient in numbers and types of troops needed to achieve the aim that the PM set in April, to train sufficient Afghans in Oruzgan to replace us. This is because it takes not just trainers but also formed units to fight alongside a building army (referred to as 'partnering' and continually mentioned by General McChrystal, the commanding general). To do otherwise is to rush the emerging Afghan security forces to failure. That's not 'clever' or 'serious'.

If you can put more troops into a conflict and refuse to do so on the grounds of political expediency, there is a moral question about the contribution. If your troops are suffering and inflicting casualties above token levels but are not strong enough to achieve some decisive result even locally, then morality must become an issue. Why are we fighting the same fights in roughly the same places against generally the same people, where we kill a few of them, they kill a few of us, and we both kill civilians? Is that what Kelly calls 'astute'? Is this 'careful calibration'?

Kelly mentions that the Defence Minister relies on tsunamis and earthquakes as reasons for Australia's 'real priority' being 'home defence and light duties in the region'. This is just plainly wrong. The kind of forces that go to earthquakes and tsunamis, and even those that might be held in readiness for permissive evacuations of Australians from Pacific hotspots, are generally not those that would go to Oruzgan Province.

This war is not won just because a questionably committed US president has provided half the number of US troops requested by his military commander for a limited period. The US needs its allies because it is desperately short of resources even if it does not publicly embarrass them when their contribution is only token. This war should be prosecuted effectively by all allies, not just the US, UK, Denmark and Canada. The Prime Minister roundly condemned NATO last April for doing exactly what he is doing now.

As Liam Fox (UK Conservative Shadow Defence Secretary) said recently, 'Common security implies common commitments'. Get serious, get moral or get out.

Photo by Flickr user lafrancevi, used under a Creative Commons license.

A key architect of the comprehensive climate change bill before the Senate and a champion of ambitious climate policy, Kerry 'gets' the science, policy and politics of climate change better than just about anyone. With refreshing candour, Kerry outlined the inadequacy of current emissions reduction pledges – including those of the US – in light of the latest science, but highlighted the importance of taking the initial steps in the right direction.

Kerry listed some of the impressive achievements of the Obama Administration, from the largest investment in clean energy in US history ($80 billion of stimulus money), to raising fuel efficiency standards on US vehicles, to unprecedented clean technology partnerships with developing countries. This concerted combination of domestic and international engagement on climate change and clean energy has unquestionably brought the developed and developing worlds closer to a comprehensive climate change agreement than ever before.

But legislators in the US Senate are yet to agree on cap-and-trade legislation that would give other countries the confidence that the US will reduce its emissions by any specific amount, and this is a major constraint on the Copenhagen negotiations. But far from using Congressional politicking as an excuse for international inaction, Kerry was insistent that the Senate's deliberations 'can be enormously assisted by what happens here' in Copenhagen.

The critical element of a deal that would assist Congressional deliberations, according to Kerry, is an agreement from the major developing country emitters that they will formalise their domestic mitigation commitments into an international treaty and subject them to international monitoring, reporting and verification (I consider these issues in more detail here). 'Shared responsibility must include an obligation to share information about each country's good faith efforts to keep its commitments', according to Kerry. 'People need to trust the process, and that trust is built through transparency.'

Kerry's speech is not, however, a one-way demand for concessions by developing countries. He argued persuasively in favour of a large US financial commitment to assist developing countries reduce emissions and adapt to climate change (a key developing country priority), recognising America's historical contribution to climate change and extolling the creative ways in which finance could be raised to supplement public transfers.

In a telling revelation of the US negotiating strategy, Kerry said that the US should be prepared to provide more funding 'as other countries clarify their own efforts for transparency and mitigation'. This strategy was confirmed on Thursday by Secretary of State Clinton, who said the US would be prepared to contribute towards a global finance package of US$100 billion annually by 2020 'in the context of a strong accord in which all major economies stand behind meaningful mitigation actions and provide full transparency as to their implementation'.

With a political accord in Copenhagen that incorporates transparent commitments from developing countries, Kerry insists that the Congress 'will pass' a comprehensive energy and climate package next year that will reduce US emissions by putting a price on carbon – most likely in the US spring. This optimism is not blind faith, but a product of the bipartisan bridges Kerry has been building in the Senate in his bid to pass the legislation.

If Congress passes its climate bill as Kerry predicts, the international community could have the subsequent word in the conversation soon thereafter. Kerry wants to 'come back together next year to transform the Copenhagen political agreement into a binding international treaty.' In Kerry's view, a new deadline should not be a distant one: 'I believe an early summer date of June or July 2010 is realistic and necessary'.

Much will be said on the weekend about the success or otherwise of the Copenhagen outcome. Politicians will mostly hail it as a success, civil society will mostly condemn it as a failure. I'll be measuring its success at least partly against the blueprint laid out in Kerry's speech. The question I'll be asking is not 'will Copenhagen solve the climate crisis?', but rather 'will Copenhagen improve the climate conversation?'

Photo by the author.

Initially, Mr Rudd chose not to set out a blueprint for an APc precisely because he regarded the process as a consultative one and wanted to ascertain the views of other relevant countries in the course of developing the concept.

Australia has every right, as part of the South East Asian and South West Pacific region, to suggest policies for the region's future security, as it has often done in the past (eg. the establishment of APEC, the Cambodian peace process and the evolution of the ARF).

Cook's assumption that there is an agreed ASEAN position on the APc, as reflected in the second track conference he attended in Kuala Lumpur, is questionable. ASEAN, as was evident at the Sydney conference and in my own discussions during my Special Envoy mission, does not necessarily have a united view on the APc.

While there is acknowledgement, as Mr Rudd stressed again on 4 December, that ASEAN should have a central role in any new regional architecture, there is also recognition in ASEAN countries that, as an organisation, it needs to be stable and constructive to fulfil this role.

Prime Minister Rudd is responding to incontrovertible change in the region and a wide perception that more effective arrangements are required as the next decade unfolds.

New and forward-looking ideas are often received with some scepticism (as was APEC in 1989 and, more recently, the establishment of the G20). I believe Mr Rudd will press ahead with what is widely seen as a necessary, forward-looking and visionary response to the major changes underway in our region. I do not believe he will be deterred by what Cook describes as a 'backlash', mainly driven by some Singaporean officials and government-linked think tanks.

The attitudes of government participants from a number of key countries (including the ROK) towards a need for more effective regional arrangements are evolving in a positive direction and are on the public record.

There are various aspects of the negotiations in Copenhagen that poor countries are interested in, but the most important one is finance. Poor countries want to know how much money rich countries are ready to provide to help them tackle their energy needs. Coal, they note, is generally the cheapest way of producing electricity. If rich countries want poor countries to use alternative and more expensive technologies to produce clean energy, then rich countries must pay for it.

What sort of sums are we looking at? It is useful to bear in mind that total foreign aid flows from all western OECD countries at present amount to around $120 billion per annum. It is also useful to remember that the cost of responding to the recent global financial crisis in rich countries is variously put at somewhere between $2,000 to $4,000 billion.

The sums mentioned by reliable observers as appropriate transfers from rich to poor countries vary from around $100 billion per year up to $400 billion or more. In other words, it seems that assistance (or some other forms of financial transfers) from OECD countries to will have to at least double in order to satisfy developing countries – and quite possibly, will have to rise by yet another $100 billion or so again.

So these are the key issues – access to energy, and money. And both issues seem close to intractable. On one hand, in the absence of large changes in technologies, it seems hard to imagine any scenario where poor countries could gain access to the energy they want without total global carbon emissions continuing to rise. Of course, it might be possible to make room for large increases in energy consumption in poor countries if rich countries were prepared to cut back their own energy use sharply. But pigs will fly before this happens.

On the other hand, very large financial transfers will be required to induce poor countries to move away from current emission-intensive coal technology. And the chances that rich countries will be prepared to provide the additional needed transfers seem very slim.

Whatever the outcome of the Copenhagen conference in the next two days, the impact will be slight unless these two issues – access to energy, and money – are properly addressed. But it seems certain that poor countries will not give up their right to energy. And it seems unlikely that rich countries will be prepared to provide the additional $100 billion or $200 billion or so needed to finance new technologies in developing countries. For the time being at least, the outlook is not encouraging.

Photo by Flickr user thomas.merton, used under a Creative Commons license.

The bottom-up process has been occurring since Bali in 2007; the top-down process only began a few weeks ago. Both have gathered steam in Copenhagen. Compromise on most of the key sticking points, however, is as elusive as ever.

The most significant point of contention relates to the commitments of developing countries – particularly the major emitters – under a new international climate change regime. Developing countries continue to resist any binding, quantifiable and internationally verifiable commitments, while developed countries continue to insist that the absence of such commitments would be a deal-breaker.

The bottom-up draft text dealing with this issue proposes a fudgy resolution that would effectively mean that developing countries would only be held to account for the emissions-reduction policies or projects they undertake with the financial support of developed countries. The responses of developed countries to that proposal were summed up frankly by US chief negotiator, Todd Stern, who summarily dismissed it as 'old think' on the basis of which the US would not be prepared to negotiate.

The substantive dispute over the nature and extent of developing country commitments is also wrapped up in a debate over the legal form that a new climate agreement might take. Developed countries want a single new treaty that incorporates key elements of the Kyoto Protocol but also provides a framework for mandatory developing country emissions reductions.

Developing countries want simply to amend the Kyoto Protocol to require deeper emissions reduction targets from developed countries, with additional issues such as finance, technology, deforestation and adaptation to be addressed through a package of decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Small island states want an immediate, two-treaty solution that would both extend Kyoto and incorporate the additional issues into a new 'Copenhagen Protocol'.

This week, countries focused on negotiating the emissions accounting rules that would be used to determine compliance with the eventual targets. Rules relating to the accounting of emissions sources and removals in the agricultural, land and forest sectors have proven particularly contentious, as this will have a big effect on the ease with which countries like Australia could meet its targets. Developing countries worry that generous land-sector accounting rules will allow countries to 'cook the books' and effectively meet their targets without reducing emissions.

Australian negotiators have reportedly revealed that Australia would only sign on to the upper-end of its emissions reduction target range (5-25% below 2000 levels by 2020) if these rules are resolved favourably to Australia. This issue will be one to watch in the coming days.

Finally, deep divisions remain over the amount of finance developed countries should provide to help developing countries reduce emission and adapt to climate change. A developed world consensus has emerged that US$10 billion dollars of 'fast-start' finance should be provided to developing countries as an interim measure to bridge the gap between now and 2013 (when any new medium-term climate agreement would take effect).

Developed countries have started pledging contributions toward this fund, but they remain silent on medium and long term funding, as do the various texts that are flying around. One person who is anything but silent on this issue is the Sudanese negotiator who speaks on behalf of the G77 & China Group of developing countries in the negotiations – he has dismissed the $10 billion fast-start package as 'no finance whatsoever' and is demanding vastly greater sums as a precondition for developing country participation in a new climate regime.

Photo by Flickr user gak67nz, used under a Creative Commons license.